

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNIT 30400
APO AE 09131-0400

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 55-15

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PLANS AND POLICY

Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

1. **Summary.** This directive prescribes policies, responsibilities, and procedures for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) implementation of and compliance with provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) which entered into force 9 November 1992.
2. **Applicability.** This directive applies to USEUCOM and its Service Component Commands. Other Department of Defense (DoD) unified or specified commands, DoD agencies, U.S. forces subordinate to NATO Commands, U.S. Joint Task Forces (JTF), and DoD related activities operating in the Treaty Area of Application (AoA) must also comply with its provisions.
3. **Internal Controls.** This Directive does not contain internal control provisions and is not subject to the requirements of the internal management control program. For USEUCOM and subordinate joint activities, the applicable internal control directive is ED 50-8, Internal Management Control Program.
4. **Suggested Improvements.** The proponent for this directive is the Arms Control Branch, Treaty and Threat Reduction Division, Plans and Policy Directorate. Suggested improvements should be forwarded to HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-T-AC, Unit 30400, APO AE 09131-0400
5. **References.** See Appendix A.
6. **Explanation of Terms.** See Appendix B
7. **Background.** The CFE Treaty was signed 19 November 1990 and entered into force on 9 November 1992. The Treaty's original objective was to decrease the risk of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact by reducing the number of conventional forces in Europe, balancing the levels of specific types of offensive equipment between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and restricting deployment possibilities within the AoA. The Treaty uses an Annual Exchange of Information (AEI) to disclose information concerning each State Party; e.g., force structure and organization, conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, declared sites, etc.. A highly intrusive inspection regime is used to build confidence between States Parties that the

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information is accurate. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Treaty has remained effective primarily because of the information exchange and inspection regimes. The current 30 signatory States are divided into two groups of States Parties, the western group, comprised of the original 16 NATO members, and the eastern group, comprised of the former Warsaw Pact countries.

8. **Summary of CFE Treaty Provisions.** (See reference 2a(1) for the complete Treaty text.)

a. The Treaty contains a set of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Subject to the Treaty (CAEST). From this set, the Treaty identifies five categories of military equipment that are most critical to offensive warfare: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The Treaty calls this equipment conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. This is commonly referred to as Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE).

b. The Treaty limits and balances the overall number of TLE each group of States Parties can hold within the entire AoA. The Treaty also divides the AoA into five zones and places further limits on the numbers of ground TLE each group can deploy into those zones.

c. The Treaty specifies that these groups of States Parties are responsible for dividing up group holdings into national holdings. However, the Treaty also restricts a single State Party's holdings to 13,300 tanks, 13,700 artillery pieces, 20,000 ACVs, 1,500 attack helicopters, and 5,150 combat aircraft.

d. The restrictions outlined above are limited to a State Party's conventional ground, air, and air defense forces. Naval forces, unless permanently land based, are excluded as are internal security forces.

e. The Treaty requires each State Party to exchange information yearly (see Appendix E) with all other States Parties on 15 December, with information effective 1 January of the following year, on its forces within the AoA as follows:

- (1) Command structure and personnel numbers;
- (2) Overall TLE holdings by zone;
- (3) Location and numbers of certain CAEST in service with conventional forces;
- (4) Location and numbers of TLE in the AoA not in service with conventional forces;
- (5) Information on objects of verification (OOVs) and declared sites.

f. The Treaty requires States Parties to notify other States Parties of certain changes to the AEI data throughout the year (see Appendix E).

g. The Treaty permits States Parties to inspect other States Parties' declared sites or specified geographic areas with as little as 36 hours notification to verify this information (see Appendices C and D).

h. The Treaty contains detailed instructions on how States Parties can reduce TLE in order to meet Treaty-mandated force levels. These instructions include provisions for notification and inspection of reduction or certification events.

i. The Treaty establishes a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) which meets in Vienna at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a forum for discussion and problem resolution.

9. **Legal Basis**. The President, with advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the CFE Treaty, thereby making it legally binding on the U.S. government (USG) under the provisions of international law. DoD Directive 2060.1 (reference 4a) directs all DoD activities to comply with the provisions of the Treaty.

10. **Policy**. The Commander, USEUCOM (COMUSEUCOM) (formerly known as Commander-in-Chief, USEUCOM (USCINCEUR)), serving as DoD's CFE Treaty Executive Agent, will ensure all DoD agencies, Service Component Commands, U.S. forces under NATO control, and U.S. JTFs working in the Treaty AoA comply with the provisions of the CFE Treaty.

11. **Operational Security**. The requirement to comply with the CFE Treaty does not relieve commanders of their responsibilities for ensuring operational security (OPSEC) and force protection for the units and forces under their command. While the CFE Treaty leaves little room for refusing or denying inspections, it does provide measures for protecting sensitive equipment and information. Any circumstance in which commanders believe these measures will prove inadequate and in which vital information or operations will be compromised by CFE Treaty inspection must be relayed to HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC as soon as possible. These circumstances should be held to the absolute minimum, as the final decision to deny or refuse inspections will take high-level USG approval and resolution.

12. **Responsibilities**.

a. The Joint Staff will (included for information only):

(1) Represent the U.S. military in the USG National Security Council interagency national security coordination process relating to the CFE Treaty;

(2) Coordinate with HQ USEUCOM, Service Headquarters, and other unified and specified commands to establish U.S. military policy and procedures for implementation, and compliance with, provisions of the CFE Treaty;

(3) Provide military policy guidance relating to the CFE Treaty to USEUCOM and other affected commands, as required;

(4) Review and approve/reject data notifications from HQ USEUCOM submitted on the Compliance Monitoring and Tracking System (CMTS);

(5) Coordinate with and assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State (DoS) in implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions of the CFE Treaty;

(6) Participate as a permanent member of DoD Compliance Review Group (CRG) and raise to the CRG for resolution any compliance issue not covered by existing policy.

b. Service Headquarters will (included for information only):

(1) IAW the Protocol on Existing Types (POET), reference 2a(1), provide the Format F13 notification IAW Appendix A, reference 4b; technical data; and photographs of new equipment subject to the Treaty entering into service within the AoA. Coordinate this action with HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC before making notification;

(2) Ensure movement of all TLE from outside the AoA into the AoA is coordinated through Service Component Command headquarters.

c. COMUSEUCOM serves as the DoD Executive Agent for implementation of the CFE Treaty IAW Appendix A, references 4.c.(2) & 4.c.(3). As such, COMUSEUCOM is responsible for treaty compliance and directs and fulfills as necessary the requirements outlined in subparagraphs 12c(1) through 12c(13) below. Appendix G, Command Relationships, establishes command relationships for purposes of CFE Treaty implementation.

(1) General responsibilities. Service Component Commanders are responsible to COMUSEUCOM for treaty compliance on installations where they exercise installation management authority. Tenant organizations will follow Service Component Commander guidance in accordance with this directive to insure treaty compliance. Commanders or agency heads of all U.S. Combatant Commands, DoD Agencies, Service Component Commands, U.S. forces subordinate to NATO commands, U.S. JTF Commands, and other U.S. DoD-related activities with personnel, premises, and/or CAEST in the AoA will, as applicable:

(a) Provide information, assistance and cooperation as required to the Service Component Commanders for implementation and compliance with treaty obligations;

(b) Develop plans and procedures necessary to ensure the organization's compliance with the CFE Treaty and this Directive;

(c) Provide annual personnel, equipment, and location data and change notifications IAW Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information (PONEI). This information will be provided IAW procedures listed in Appendix E;

(d) Initiate changes to notified data IAW Appendix E;

(e) Develop procedures for tracking entry into, and exit of, temporarily deployed ground and air TLE and reporting this in the AEI. This is TLE not assigned to USEUCOM units that is in the AoA for longer than seven days;

(f) Develop and implement procedures for round-the-clock notification to subordinate units and sites of impending inspections and other time-sensitive inspection information;

(g) Designate CFE Treaty Compliance Officers responsible for hosting and coordinating CFE Treaty declared site inspections. Ensure these site Compliance Officers develop, exercise, and, as necessary, update specific procedures for receiving and supporting a CFE Treaty declared site inspection; e.g. transportation, billeting, messing, security, administrative area, medical support, communications;

(h) Develop and exercise procedures for receiving challenge inspections;

(i) Establish Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), Information Security (INFOSEC), and OPSEC procedures to ensure security and force protection requirements are met;

(j) Incorporate review of CFE Treaty plans into the command inspection program or annual general inspection, where appropriate;

(k) Establish procedures to ensure personnel are informed of, and are aware of, applicability of the CFE Treaty to U.S. forces, and of the requirement to ensure no danger comes to CFE Treaty inspectors;

(l) Provide guidance to personnel concerning their responsibilities in answering CFE Treaty inspector questions;

(m) Establish public information and awareness programs;

(n) Include estimated CFE Treaty implementation costs in annual budget requests or Program Objective Memorandum (POM);

(o) Establish procedures to ensure the Defense Threat Reduction Agency-On Site Europe (DTRA-OSE) is informed of, and updated on, telephone numbers of area/site command centers or 24-hour duty offices;

(p) Review and, if necessary, update CFE Treaty plans annually;

(q) Organizations with CAEST will establish procedures for each site to maintain a record of changes in the status of TLE to insure inspection teams are accurately informed of reasons for differences between the most recent U.S. exchange of information and the numbers of TLE present during inspections;

(r) Organizations with CAEST will establish procedures to insure that the accidental destruction or loss of TLE is immediately reported to appropriate Treaty Compliance Officer for proper notification and inclusion in the AEI;

(s) For organizations responsible for moving CAEST into or out of the AoA or for moving CAEST within the AoA, establish procedures to inform U.S. Army, Europe & 7th Army (USAREUR/7A), ATTN: AEAGC-IO (USAREUR/7A-AEAGC-IO) of Army CAEST movement; U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), ATTN: XPPT (USAFE/XPPT) of Air Force CAEST movement; U.S. Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR), ATTN: G-3 of Marine Corps CAEST movements; and U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR), ATTN: N5 of Navy CAEST movements.

(2) U.S. Defense Representatives will:

(a) Advise HQ USEUCOM of Treaty related matters pertaining to U.S. obligations in host countries;

(b) Assist HQ USEUCOM and DTRA as required to facilitate accomplishment of U.S. CFE Treaty obligations, including receiving inspections;

(3) Director, ECJ1 (Manpower, Personnel and Administration Directorate) will:

(a) Provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.

(b) Provide information annually on the personnel strength for HQ USEUCOM billets, including USEUCOM's subunified commands (Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), U.S. Forces Azores (USFORAZ), and Iceland Defense Forces (ICEDEFOR)) to ECJ5-T-AC for the AEI.

(c) Liaison with Director, ECRA, to provide information annually on the personnel strength of Reservists who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service for a continuous period of more than 90 days, serving at HQ USEUCOM, and not reported by other directorates to ECJ5-T-AC for the AEI.

(d) Liaison with Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to provide information annually on personnel strength for defense agencies operating within the AoA to ECJ5-T-AC for the AEI.

(e) Liaison with United States National Military Representative to NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (USNMR SHAPE) to provide information annually on U.S. personnel strength for NATO organizations within the AoA to ECJ5-T-AC for the AEI.

(4) Director, ECJ2 (Intelligence Directorate) will:

(a) Provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5;

(b) Serve as COMUSEUCOM's Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for intelligence and counter-intelligence matters.

(5) Director, ECJ3 (Operations Directorate) will:

(a) Provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5;

(b) Provide command center capability for transmission and tracking of inspection notifications from initial notification to conclusion;

(c) Generate and maintain checklists to ensure prompt notification of appropriate USEUCOM personnel/organizations, DTRA-OSE, and Service Component Command headquarters for CFE Treaty reporting, impending on-site inspections, evaluations, or other CFE Treaty related actions;

(d) Provide ECJ5-T-AC information on USEUCOM's planned exercises and events to ensure CFE Treaty zonal limits are not exceeded and any required notifications are submitted to the Joint Staff (JS) for U.S. and NATO coordination.

(6) Director, ECJ4 (Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate) will:

(a) Provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.

(b) Serve as HQ USEUCOM OPR for the change in status of real property from or to U.S. control. These actions sometimes require CFE Treaty notification. Coordinate with ECJ5-T-AC before completion of actions.

(7) Director, ECJ5 (Plans and Policy Directorate) will:

(a) Serve as COMUSEUCOM's OPR for Treaty policy matters;

(b) Represent COMUSEUCOM, and as appropriate, the U.S. at international meetings on CFE Treaty policy and implementation matters as required.

(c) Establish and coordinate policy and procedures for implementation of CFE Treaty provisions in theater;

(d) Provide theater guidance for submission of CFE Treaty notifications;

(e) Operate and use a CMTS terminal to generate, approve, compile, and transmit notifications, invitations and other messages as required by CFE Treaty;

(f) Review and action CFE Treaty notifications from Service Component Commands IAW Appendix E via CMTS;

(g) Serve as the HQ USEUCOM OPR for the AEI and changes to notified data;

- (h) Submit AEI to JS J5/Conventional Arms Control Division (CACD) annually;
 - (i) Coordinate and establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DTRA to define functions, responsibilities, duties, and organizational relationships for U.S. forces implementation and compliance with the CFE Treaty;
 - (j) Coordinate with DTRA-OSE in inspection policy matters as well as execution of escort mission for U.S. units undergoing inspections;
 - (k) Provide coordination with host country arms control agencies as required;
 - (l) Facilitate theater arms control workshops and conferences as required.
- (8) Director, ECJ6 (Command, Control, and Communication Systems Directorate) will provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.
- (9) Director, ECPA (Public Affairs Directorate) will:
- (a) Provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.
 - (b) Provide public affairs guidance, press releases, and contingency statements for use by American Embassies, Service Component Commands, and subordinate units, as required.
- (10) Director, ECJA (Office of the Judge Advocate) will:
- (a) Provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.
 - (b) Provide legal guidance, as required, regarding the interpretation and implementation of the CFE Treaty;
 - (c) Provide legal representation, when necessary, for negotiations of agreements between the U.S. and host nations required for implementation of the CFE Treaty or collateral matters.
 - (d) Coordinate with DoD General Counsel and other legal offices as appropriate.
- (11) Director, ECSM (Special Assistant for Security Matters) will:
- (a) Provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.
 - (b) Serve as the OPR for physical security and force protection.
- (12) Director, ECSO (Special Operations) will provide staff coordination on Treaty matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.

(13) Director, ECRA (Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs) will provide information for the AEI annually to ECJ1 on Reservists who are activated for more than 90 continuous days, serving at HQ USEUCOM, and not reported by other directorates.

(14) Commander, United States Air Forces, Europe (COMUSAFE); Commanding General, United States Army, Europe & 7th Army (CGUSAREUR/7A); Commander, United States Marine Forces, Europe (COMMARFOREUR); Commander, United States Naval Forces Europe (COMUSNAVEUR); and Director, Defense Logistics Agency-Europe (DLA-E) will operate and use the CMTS to generate and transmit data, notifications, and other messages as required by the CFE Treaty and by specific requirements outlined in subsequent appendices.

13. **Procedures**. See Appendices.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL

JOHN B. SYLVESTER
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Staff

RICKEY K. WILLIAMS
LTC, USA
Adjutant General

Appendices:

- A – References
- B – Common and Treaty-Related Terms, Abbreviations, and Acronyms Used in ED 55-15
- C – Inspection Policy
- D – Inspection Procedures
- E – Data Reporting and Notifications
- F – Equipment Disposal
- G – Command Relationships

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AMEMBASSY TBILISI
AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
HQDA
HQAF
HQMC
CNO
USTRANSCOM
DIA/DAH
DTRA
DLA

Appendix A

References

1. References listed below contain key international and national policy documents established for implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

2. International Documents.

a. Basic Documents

(1) Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 19 November 1990.

(2) Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft, 19 November 90.

(3) Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 10 July 1992.

(4) Provisional Application of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, 10 July 1992.

(5) Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, 15-31 May 1996.

(6) Formal Conclusions of the Second Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, 28 May-1 June 2001.

b. International Guidance: Relevant Joint Consultative Group (JCG) Decisions

(1) Distribution of costs of inspections between or among States Parties, worked out in compliance with Article XVI, Paragraph 2 F of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, 18 December 1991.

(2) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on additional procedures for reduction by destruction of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 11 May 1993.

(3) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on an additional procedure for reduction by destruction of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 29 June 1993.

(4) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on an additional procedure for reduction by conversion for non-military purposes of battle tanks limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 12 October 1993.

(5) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on a change to the list of vehicles which may be converted to non-military purposes and on an additional procedure for reduction by conversion for non-military purposes of armoured combat vehicles limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 12 October 1993.

(6) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on an additional procedure for reduction by destruction of artillery limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 8 March 1994.

(7) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on a change to the list of vehicles which may be converted to non-military purposes, 3 May 1994.

(8) Decision on an additional procedure for reduction by destruction of artillery limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 24 May 1994.

(9) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on the scale of distribution of common expenses of the Joint Consultative Group, 23 May 1994.

(10) Decision on an additional procedures for reduction by destruction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and a statement by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group, 14 July 1995.

(11) JCG Decision (concerning the flank), 17 November 1995.

(12) JCG Dec. 18-96, 'Reduction of BT & ACVs by Conversion'.

(13) Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on the lists of the existing types of conventional armaments and equipment, 11 November 1997.

3. U.S. National Policy Guidance.

a. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE) – Message from the President of the United States, Treaty Document 102-8, 9 July 1991.

b. Memorandum, National Security Council, 14 November 2001, Subject: Record of Conclusions and Follow-on Actions, October 18 Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) Meeting (C).

4. Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. DoD Directive 2060.1, Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements, 9 Jan 01.

b. Data Management Notification System, Notification Management System Users Manual Version 2.5, August 2002.

c. Messages.

(1) JCS, 282139Z June 1991, Subject: Guidance for Receiving CFE Challenge Inspections (C).

(2) CJCS, 022101Z July 1991, Subject: Executive Agent for Implementation and Compliance of the CFE Treaty (U).

(3) CJCS, 022102Z July 1991, Subject: Executive Agent for Actions related to the CFE Treaty (U).

(4) JCS, 160831Z November 1991, Subject: Interim Response to HQ USEUCOM request for Guidance (U).

(5) JCS, 041155Z January 1992, Subject: Response to HQ USEUCOM request for Guidance (C).

(6) JCS, 221630Z April 1992, Subject: Response to HQ USEUCOM Request for Guidance (U).

(7) JCS, 251530Z June 1992, Subject: Declaring DEPMEDS as Sensitive Point during CFE Inspections (U).

(8) JCS, 292215Z July 1992, Subject: FMS Aircraft and CFE (C).

(9) JCS, 112104Z January 1996, Subject: CFE: Inspection Briefing Guidance (U).

(10) CJCS, 231420Z October 2001, Subject: Application of Arms Control Agreements during Counterterrorist Operations

d. Memorandums.

(1) Secretary of Defense, 14 June 1991, Subject: Executive Agent for Actions Related to the CFE Treaty.

(2) Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 31 January 1992, Subject: Minutes of the Conventional Arms Control Compliance Review Group, 27 January 1992.

(3) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 14 July 1993, Subject: CFE Compliance Review Group meeting, 23 Jun 1993.

(4) The Joint Staff J5-CACD, 2 October 1995, Subject: Request for Information and Guidance: Response.

(5) The Joint Staff J5-CACD, 11 December 1995, Subject: Request for Joint Staff Guidance.

(6) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (S&TS/ACI&C), 2 April 1997, Subject: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Compliance Certification Rationale: Access to Hardened Aircraft Shelters.

(7) The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), 23 October 1998, Subject: Guidance on Implementing Procedural Changes to Current Practices on Preparing the Annual Data Exchange Under the CFE Treaty (C).

(8) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 October 1998, Subject: Changes to US Reporting Practices Pursuant to the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty (C-US Only).

5. HQ USEUCOM.

a. Memorandum of Understanding between USEUCOM, USLANTCOM and OSIA for Mutual Liaison and Support Operations in Implementation of the CFE Treaty, 10 May 91.

b. Messages.

(1) USCINCEUR, 271303Z September 1991, Subject: USEUCOM Flight Operations Support for CFE Treaty (U).

(2) USCINCEUR, 301701 October 1991, Subject: CFE Inspection of U.S. Intelligence Facilities (C).

(3) USCINCEUR, 181600Z May 1995, Subject: Disposition of Excess Treaty Limited Equipment (U).

(4) USCINCEUR, 151645Z September 1992, Subject: CFE/CFE IX Inspection Requirements/Guidance (U)

(5) USCINCEUR, 261921Z October 2001, Subject: Arms Control Inspections (C).

c. Memorandum: USEUCOM ECJ5-F, 19 March 1996, Subject: CFE Treaty Year.

Appendix B

Common and Treaty-Related Terms, Abbreviations, and Acronyms Used in ED 55-15

1. **Explanation of Terms:** Treaty terms are defined in Article II, reference 2a(1) and in Section I, Protocol on Inspections (POI), reference 2a(1).

2. **Common and Treaty Abbreviations and Acronyms used in ED 55-15 :**

ACV	Armored Combat Vehicle
AEI	Annual Exchange of Information
AIFV	Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle
AoA	Area of Application (of the CFE Treaty) (See paragraph 1(A), Article II, CFE Treaty for complete definition)
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
ASA	Ammunition Storage Area
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
CACD	Conventional Arms Control Division (Joint Staff J5)
CAEST	Conventional Armaments and Equipment Subject to the Treaty
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty)
CFE 1a	Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (also known as the CFE 1a Concluding Act)
CFEIT	CFE Inspection Team
CGUSAREUR/7A	Commanding General, U.S. Army, Europe & 7 th Army
COCOM	Combatant Command (command authority)
COMMARFOREUR	Commander, U.S. Marine Forces, Europe
COMUSEUCOM	Commander, U.S. European Command (formerly known as USCINCEUR - Commander-in-Chief, USEUCOM)
COMUSNAVEUR	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe
COMUSAFE	Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Europe

CMTS	Compliance Monitoring and Tracking System
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CONEX	Container Express
CRG	Compliance Review Group
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
DEPMEDS	Field Deployable Medical Sets
DLA-E	Defense Logistics Agency-Europe
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DRMS-I	Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service International
DS/SA	Declared Site/Specified Area
DTRA-OSE	Defense Threat Reduction Agency On-Site Europe
ECJ1	USEUCOM Manpower, Personnel and Administration Directorate
ECJ2	USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate
ECJ3	USEUCOM Operations Directorate
ECJ4	USEUCOM Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate
ECJ5	USEUCOM Plans and Policy Directorate
ECJ6	USEUCOM Command, Control, and Communication Systems Directorate
ECJA	USEUCOM Office of the Judge Advocate
ECPA	USEUCOM Public Affairs Directorate
ECSM	USEUCOM Special Assistant for Security Matters
ECRA	USEUCOM Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs Directorate
ECSO	USEUCOM Special Operations Directorate

EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
HAS	Hardened Aircraft Shelter
HQAF	HQ, U.S. Air Force
HQDA	HQ, Department of the Army
HQMC	HQ, U.S. Marine Corps
IAW	In accordance with
ICEDEFOR	Iceland Defense Forces
INFOSEC	Information Security
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
JNOC	(HQ USEUCOM) Joint Nuclear Operations Center
JS	Joint Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
LAL	Look-Alike
LNO	Liaison Officer
MARFOREUR	U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe
MILVAN	Military Van (container)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Meals, Ready to Eat
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
OOV	Object of Verification
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC	Operational Security
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

POE	Point of Entry/Exit (for Inspection Teams)
POET	Protocol on Existing Types
POI	Protocol on Inspections
POL	Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PONEI	Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information
PX/BX	Post Exchange/Base Exchange
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TLE	Treaty Limited Equipment (conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters subject to numerical limitations)
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces, Europe
USAREUR/7A	U.S. Army, Europe & 7th Army
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USFORAZ	U.S. Forces Azores
USG	U.S. Government
USJFCOM	U.S. Joint Forces Command (formerly U.S. Atlantic Command)
USLANTCOM	U.S. Atlantic Command (renamed U.S. Joint Forces Command)
USNAVEUR	U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
USNMR	United States National Military Representative to NATO

USAFE	United States Air Forces, Europe
VOQ	Visiting Officers Quarters
WS3	Weapons Storage and Security System

Appendix C

Inspection Policy

1. **Policy Overview:** With few exceptions, U.S. forces, equipment, and premises within the AoA are subject to inspection in any country in which they are present, training, or operating. In addition, U.S. forces under NATO direction are also subject to inspection as U.S. forces. USG policy is to accept all legitimate CFE Treaty inspection requests, but at the same time protect U.S. military equities and OPSEC to the fullest extent possible under the terms of the Treaty. In most cases, OPSEC can be protected through advanced inspection warning, good inspection planning, and use of managed access procedures where appropriate. However, for situations in which these measures are not sufficient and in which pending inspections may irreparably harm security of particular operations, commanders must notify HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC through their Service Component Command headquarters as soon as possible. Other more specific policy guidelines are listed below.

2. **Escort Relationship.** While on a U.S. declared site and during inspections of U.S. facilities during challenge inspections, all U.S. members of the U.S. escort team will be under the control of the DTRA-OSE escort team chief. DTRA-OSE will escort the CFE Inspection Team (CFEIT). The CFEIT may organize itself into two or three sub-groups. Each escort sub-group will include DTRA-OSE escorts and translators, assisted by site personnel. The number of DTRA-OSE personnel will normally not exceed 10. Site personnel will work closely with DTRA-OSE escort personnel to ensure Treaty compliance.

3. **Access.** The overarching philosophy of USEUCOM with regard to access is that, as a rule, we will seek to maximize openness while taking those steps necessary to protect the security of sensitive equipment and information. The Treaty provides a hierarchy of measures that can be used to protect those small number of truly sensitive items and points that we have. Site commanders desiring to use Treaty provisions to protect sensitive information or equipment should use the least conspicuous rule(s) first, in the following order:

a. Two-meter rule. In the case of personnel doors this can be used to deny access to sensitive areas without drawing attention to their special nature. In the case of containers that may contain sensitive items, access can be denied if their dimensions are less than two meters. See paragraph 3g and 3h below for additional guidance on the two-meter rule.

b. Shrouding. Where access to rooms containing sensitive equipment/items is allowed, shrouding should be routinely used. See paragraph 3j below for additional guidance on shrouding.

c. Sensitive point rules. These should be used as a last resort. See paragraph 4 below for additional guidance on sensitive points. If used, the least restrictive form of the sensitive point rule should be used, in the following order:

- delay access in order to shroud sensitive equipment;
- limit access to sensitive areas;
- deny access to sensitive points;

d. The CFEIT must be allowed visual access to TLE sufficient to confirm their number, type, model, or variant, if a variant is specified in the POET. Climbing on TLE stored in closed or tightly packed areas; e.g., Military Storage Site buildings, to obtain visual access to TLE is permitted only if approved by the site commander.

e. The CFEIT should be allowed sufficient visual access to TLE look-alikes (LALs) to assure them that vehicles have been internally constructed or modified in such a way as not to permit the transportation of a combat infantry squad. Presence of standard red-cross markings is sufficient to confirm the status of ambulances. No further access is required, but may be granted by the local commander if requested and if not disruptive to other activities at the inspection site.

f. The CFEIT will be allowed to enter any location, structure or area within a structure (unless the location or structure belongs exclusively to another OOV not designated for the current inspection and is so indicated on the site diagram) in which battle tanks, ACVs, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armored personnel carrier (APC) or armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) LALs and/or or armored vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present.

g. Access should be denied to buildings used exclusively by the U.S. that do not contain the equipment listed in paragraph 3f above and that are accessible only by personnel doors not exceeding two meters in width. Access to buildings accessible by larger doors should only be allowed up to the point at which personnel doors not exceeding two meters in width are encountered. Unless a building is declared a sensitive point the inspectors may walk around the building and look through windows to which they have access.

h. Access should be routinely denied to containers having any dimension (height, width, or length) less than two meters (paragraph 28, Section VI, POI, reference 2a(1)). If access is denied, escorts must state whether or not TLE is present and, if so, the TLE number, type, model or variant. If TLE is declared to be present, the escort team must display or declare the TLE and take steps to satisfy inspectors that no more than the declared number of TLE is present within the container; e.g., demonstrate that dimensions of container would not allow more than declared number of TLE. Containers, all dimensions of which are two meters or greater, are subject to inspection unless declared to be a sensitive point. Units must be prepared to open all such containers. However, less disruptive methods should be suggested to the inspectors, such as providing packing lists or offering to open several randomly selected containers. Specific guidance on containers includes:

(1) Any containers that contain sensitive items or equipment and to which inspectors request access will be designated as sensitive points and not opened.

In the case of containers that have been sealed by customs authorities, units should take steps to satisfy inspectors that no TLE is present by providing packing lists or other documentation indicating contents. Should inspectors insist on viewing the contents, containers of this type will be designated sensitive points and not opened.

(2) If CFEIT seek to inspect Field Deployable Medical Sets (DEPMEDS), units should take steps to satisfy them that no TLE is present by presenting packing lists or other documentation indicating contents. If the inspectors continue to demand access, the DEPMEDS should be declared sensitive points. Having declared a DEPMED set as sensitive, the escort team should offer to open the cargo doors of up to 10 per cent of those containers and MILVANS present. The doors may be randomly selected by the inspection team. If the inspectors continue to express concern, the internal seal on one of the opened MILVANS (selected by the inspection team) may be opened. If after these actions have been taken, the inspectors remain unsatisfied and record their concerns in the inspection report, the U.S. escorts should record the steps taken to satisfy the inspectors in the escort section of the inspection report.

(3) Some containers have been modified to serve as equipment. The CFE Treaty contains no provision specifying access to the interior of equipment other than look-alikes. Therefore, equipment other than look-alikes is not subject to internal inspection. If a CONEX container or other container commonly found at an inspection site has been used as the basis for construction of a piece of equipment and is no longer used as a container, it should be considered as equipment. However, for openness and transparency, if the equipment; i.e., modified container, has no easily observable external modifications and is, therefore, indistinguishable externally from other containers, it should be treated as a container during a CFE Treaty inspection.

i. Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS). IAW reference 4d(6), CFE Treaty inspectors are to be granted access to HAS only when the Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) vault is down and locked. U.S. personnel will also protect control panels from direct view using shrouding or other materials unless the control panels covers are closed. U.S. escorts will insure that photographs do not record the location of WS3 vaults and control panels. Finally, if for any reason a WS3 is unlocked or is up during a CFE Treaty inspection, the entire HAS will become a nuclear exclusion zone and access will be denied. In this case, U.S. personnel will remove aircraft from the HAS and declare the HAS a sensitive point. No photographs of the interior of the shelter will be permitted under these conditions.

j. Shrouding. Shrouding should be the routine method of denying visual access to sensitive items and information within buildings and structures which are otherwise accessible to inspectors. No effort should be taken to satisfy inspectors that there is CAEST under the shrouds if any dimension of the shrouded item or equipment is less than two meters. If all dimensions of a shrouded item are greater than two meters, a statement must be made concerning the absence or presence of CAEST. If no CAEST is present, the steps to satisfy this provision do not apply.

k. If a cargo aircraft present at an inspection site contains CAEST, the following procedures apply. The CAEST should be declared during a declared site pre-inspection briefing or if the

U.S. participates in a Host State Party pre-inspection briefing during a challenge inspection. If the CAEST has not been reported as present at the site during the annual data exchange, an explanation for its presence is required. If inspectors request, the aircraft should be opened to display the CAEST or the CAEST can be removed from the aircraft. If cargo aircraft present at the site do not contain CAEST, there is no requirement to open the aircraft; i.e., the aircraft is not a building nor a container to which all access provisions apply; there are no access provisions relating to equipment except those which apply to TLE LALs or to converted or re-categorized equipment. Special Operations aircraft (MC-130 and HC-130), not reportable or limited by the Treaty, and helicopters (MH-53J), subject to but not limited by the Treaty, which have rear ramp doors exceeding two meters in width shall be opened if CAEST has been declared to be on board. Inspection will be from the rear ramp area only. Physical access to the interior of Special Operations aircraft will not be allowed.

1. In general, access to ammunition storage areas (ASAs) should be routinely denied as they are inherently dangerous. However, controlled access may be granted to satisfy inspector concerns regarding the possible presence of CAEST. The special site safety rules required for ASAs provide the primary means for controlling access to these facilities, noting that paragraph 7, Section VI, of the POI obligates the inspected State Party to ensure the safety of the inspection team.

4. **Sensitive Point:** In accordance with criteria established in this directive, site CFE Treaty representatives will identify buildings, premises, equipment or activity which will require protection under provisions of the sensitive point regime for which explanations will be provided. These sensitive points will be identified to the DTRA-OSE escort team chief upon his arrival at the site. In consultation with the site representative, DTRA-OSE escorts will declare sensitive points as the need arises. A sensitive point should be declared only when the other site access limitations do not provide sufficient protection. Once a location has been declared as sensitive, escorts will determine the degree of access to be afforded inspectors, including physical distance to be maintained from the premises, whether cameras or other equipment will be permitted near the sensitive point, and other conditions as appropriate. General policy on sensitive points follows:

a. Sensitive points may include (but are not limited to):

- (1) Disciplinary confinement facilities;
- (2) Ammunition, including special weapons, storage areas;
- (3) POL storage areas;
- (4) Communications centers;
- (5) Headquarters buildings and tactical operations centers (TOC);
- (6) Buildings housing signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and/or processing equipment;

- (7) Sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIF); and,
- (8) Sensitive equipment storage areas.

b. Two key steps which may be utilized to satisfy inspectors that a sensitive point does not contain TLE include:

- (1) Delaying access only long enough to shroud sensitive items.
- (2) Allowing limited access where possible.

c. As a last resort, an item of equipment, a structure, or a location may be designated as a sensitive point.

(1) A statement will be made assuring the inspectors that TLE is not present (when access to a sensitive point is denied and no TLE is declared to be present, the Treaty requires no further explanation on the part of escorts) or

(2) Any TLE inside must be removed and escorts will take steps to satisfy inspectors that no more than the declared number of TLE is present. Such steps may include but are not limited to providing:

(a) an explanation of the purpose of the facility, one which matches with its physical features and which matches signs specifying its purpose.

(b) a view through open doors or ground floor windows sufficient to confirm the absence of TLE or that the building serves some other purpose.

d. Permission to take photographs of sensitive points will be denied.

e. If, during the course of an inspection, the local commander determines that, in order to protect sensitive U.S. interests, access to a sensitive point must be denied without explanation, he may do so; however, he shall confer with the DTRA-OSE escort regarding the matter. The Service Component Command representative will ensure HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC is notified as soon as possible. HQ USEUCOM will pass the information to JS J5-CACD.

5. **Photography.** Section 6, POI, reference 2a(1), permits inspectors the use of 35mm still cameras, cameras capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints, and video recorders to record the presence of CAEST. General policy on photography follows:

a. The escort team shall allow inspectors to take photographs, but the escort team will frame shots to avoid compromising OPSEC and limit the number of shots to prevent abuse of this Treaty right.

b. The Treaty expressly permits photography of interiors of structures only in structures with 50 or more CAEST present. In any structures in which less than 50 CAEST are present,

interior photography is not allowed without the permission of the escorts. When permission is requested, it should be routinely granted by the DTRA-OSE escort team unless coordination with site representatives determines the taking of photographs would be detrimental to OPSEC.

- c. Permission to take photographs of sensitive points will be denied.
- d. For guidance on taking photographs of HASs see paragraph 3i of this appendix.
- e. Inspectors may also use cameras capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints to record ambiguities in Treaty interpretation.
- f. Photographic equipment at U.S. inspection sites will be limited to 35mm still cameras, cameras capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints, and video cameras.

6. **Use of equipment not in the Treaty.** Use of equipment not included in the Treaty; e.g., digital cameras of any type, cellular telephones, global positioning system devices, will not be permitted unless the inspecting State requested its use in their initial notification of intent to inspect and the U.S. receipt of notification expressly granted permission to use that specific equipment.

7. **CAEST that is Stationed Outside the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) and Present in the ATTU for Seven Days or Less.** CAEST originating from outside the ATTU that remains in the AoA for seven days or less is not subject to CFE Treaty limitations and is exempt from most reporting requirements. This can include U.S. Army, Air Force and/or Marine Corps CAEST which may either be transiting the area or participating in an exercise prior to returning to their home station outside the ATTU. Despite this, these CAEST (with the exception of Naval (Navy and Marine Corps) combat aircraft) are still subject to inspection by CFEIT during declared site and challenge inspections if present at a non-declared site.

- a. In the case of a declared site inspection, a summary of in-transit CAEST present will be included in the pre-inspection briefing.
- b. In challenge inspection situations, although there is no requirement for a briefing, the inspectors will be notified of in-transit CAEST present at the non-declared site or facility visited by the inspection team. If such CAEST is encountered by the inspectors within the specified area, an explanation of the status of the equipment will be provided to the inspectors. This will normally be done by the DTRA-OSE escorts.

8. **CAEST that is Stationed Outside the ATTU and Present in the ATTU for More Than Seven Days.** CAEST entering the ATTU that remains in the zone for more than seven days is subject to all provisions of the CFE Treaty. Ceilings, zonal limits, and flank and notification/reporting requirements apply. Paragraphs 1(B) and 1(C), Article V, reference 2a(1), allow States Parties to temporarily exceed the sub-zonal limits for the flanks; i.e., for NATO Greece, Turkey, Norway and Iceland. Such CAEST present at an inspection site is subject to inspection IAW the POI and should be handled no differently than permanently assigned CAEST. In the pre-inspection briefing for a declared site inspection distinction should be made between

permanently assigned and temporarily deployed CAEST. If a pre-inspection briefing is given for a challenge inspection the distinction will also be made.

9. **Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Aircraft.** IAW reference 4c(8) aircraft, with or without U.S. national identification, enroute for routine maintenance or system upgrades pursuant to a FMS agreement with a non-CFE Treaty participant are not subject to the CFE Treaty. FMS aircraft are not included in U.S. information exchange and no notification is required. The following guidelines will be used during an inspection in which an FMS aircraft is present:

a. Information on the presence and status of FMS aircraft present on the inspection site will be provided to the inspection team during the pre-inspection briefing.

b. Access to FMS aircraft will be sufficient to visually confirm its type as briefed in the pre-inspection briefing.

c. If the inspection team declares an unresolved ambiguity and requests a photo, ensure the camera produces instantly developed photographs. The DTRA-OSE Escort Team Chief should not volunteer this approach but should permit it upon request.

d. In any situation that results in an unresolved ambiguity, the DTRA-OSE Escort Team Chief will ensure that all facts, explanations, and other pertinent information are clearly and accurately included in the inspection report.

e. The DTRA-OSE Escort Team Chief should not try to force its resolution during the inspection beyond the guidance provided. If CFEIT inspectors remain unsatisfied their government may pursue the issue further bilaterally or in the JCG Forum.

10. **Improperly Announced Sites.** The CFEIT has no Treaty right to inspect U.S. declared sites or specified areas that are not serviced by the inspection team's official Point of Entry/Exit (POE). U.S. policy is not to accept such inspection requests. If the CFEIT announces intent to inspect a site that is not serviced by their POE(s), the escort team chief or DTRA liaison officer (LNO) will reiterate this policy. The escort team chief, in consultation with the affected Service Component Command, may suggest alternative site(s). If the CFEIT are insistent on going to this improperly announced site, the escort team chief will notify the Service Component Command and HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC immediately. If it appears that an incident may result, HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC will seek a final determination from the JS J5 CACD on whether or not to allow the inspection as an exception to policy.

11. **Inspections at Sites Which No Longer Meet the Requirements of a Declared Site but Which Remain Under U.S. Control.** Sites from which all CAEST has been removed; i.e., no longer possess an OOV, will continue to be reported in the AEI on a Notification Format F19, Appendix A, reference 4b, for 3 years after they close if they are still in use by U.S. forces. If inspectors declare their intention to inspect such a site, the DTRA-OSE LNOs should inform the inspectors that they have no Treaty right to inspect these sites under Section VII, POI, reference 2a(1), since the site no longer meets the definition of a declared site. Inspectors can inspect these

sites during a challenge inspection of a specified area inspection, but no briefing and no site diagram will be provided.

12. Post/Base Exchange(PX/BX)/Club/Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Privileges.

Use of U.S. sales facilities will be approved on a case-by-case basis by host nation customs authorities. For inspections in Germany, as soon as the names of inspectors for a particular inspection visit are known, DTRA-OSE must present a memorandum with those names to USAREUR/7A, ATTN: AEAGC-IO, requesting access to the PX/BX. USAREUR, as the USEUCOM Executive Agent for customs, will process the memorandum. For inspections elsewhere, Treaty Compliance Officers at Service Component Command level will make whatever arrangements are needed. Sale of uniform items is not authorized. Use of snack bars, cafeterias, and theaters is authorized. Use of MWR facilities such as officers' clubs, enlisted clubs, libraries, and gymnasiums is also authorized. Inspectors will be escorted at all times.

13. Questions. Paragraph 16, Section VII, POI, reference 2a(1), allows inspectors to pose questions pertinent to the Treaty about the aggregate total of any category of TLE at any level above brigade/regiment/ wing or equivalent level. As the official representative of the USG, the DTRA-OSE Team Chief will, in consultation with Service Component Command representatives and site personnel, answer Treaty-related questions. CFEITs will also attempt to ask soldiers and airmen questions that could be considered casual conversation. The DTRA-OSE escorts should confirm whether question(s) are casual conversation or Treaty-related questions. Soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen can answer casual questions, but must be cautioned not to violate OPSEC in doing so. Soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen should also be advised that, despite appearances, virtually all inspectors understand the English language.

14. Naval Combat and Strategic Aircraft. From time to time, Naval (Navy and Marine Corps) combat aircraft or strategic bombers will be present at USEUCOM declared and non-declared sites for the purposes of training or operational deployments. According to U.S. policy (references 4c(9) and 2a(2)), these aircraft are not considered TLE and are not subject to the provisions of the CFE Treaty, even though they may be temporarily present in the AoA during training exercises, deployments, etc.

a. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps combat aircraft may consist of aircraft that are not listed in the POET, such as the F-14, or may include types that are listed. According to reference 2a(2), these aircraft are subject to the provisions of the Declaration with Respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft only if they are permanently land-based (held by a unit) within the ATTU zone. At the present time the U.S. has no such permanently land-based naval aircraft in the AoA. To prevent possible problems with inspection teams, the presence of U.S. naval or Marine Corps aircraft at an inspection site will be briefed to the inspection team during the pre-inspection briefing, however U.S. representatives will stress that they are not subject to the CFE Treaty for the reasons outlined above, they are not counted in the U.S. data, and they will not be inspected.

b. Strategic bombers; e.g. B1, B2, B52, are captured by the START Treaty and are thus not subject to CFE Treaty. Like the U.S. naval combat aircraft, their presence will be mentioned at

the pre-inspection briefing, but U.S. representatives will stress that these aircraft are not subject to the CFE Treaty, are not included in the U.S. data, and will not be inspected.

15. **Training**. Service Component Commands will insure that each declared site receives one exercise inspection at least every two years. Yearly training events are encouraged. While inspection preparations and training activities for U.S. sites are the responsibility of the Service Component Commands participation by DTRA-OSE in these events is encouraged.

Appendix D Inspection Procedures

1. **Inspection Overview.**

a. Declared site inspections. Most CFE Treaty inspections will occur at declared sites. The number of declared site inspections for which the U.S. is liable, known as its passive inspection quota, will equal 15 per cent of the number of OOV that are notified in the AEI. However, if the U.S. has equipment or premises on a foreign declared site, those assets are also vulnerable to inspection under the host nation quota.

b. Challenge inspections within a specified area. Section VIII, POI, reference 2a(1) provides for the conduct of challenge inspections within a specified area up to 65 square kilometers in size. Host countries are primarily responsible for these inspections, but the U.S. will assist and exercise its rights as the inspected State Party, as appropriate, when it has forces or facilities in the specified area. Declared sites within the specified area cannot be inspected during the specified area inspections, but can be inspected afterwards if a sequential declared site inspection is declared IAW paragraphs 40 and 41, Section VI, POI, reference 2a(1).

c. Inspection duration. A CFEIT may inspect for up to ten continuous days in one country, spending no more than 48 hours at a declared site and no more than 24 hours within a specified area.

2. **Initial Notification.** HQ USEUCOM Joint Nuclear Operations Center (JNOC) will act as the single point of contact for all theater inspection notifications. JNOC will receive initial notifications of intent to conduct inspections from HQ DTRA telephonically via Voice Format 1 (Initial Notification of CFE Inspection) followed by an electronic message. Notification will come NLT 36 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the CFEIT at the POE. Notification will contain reference to the inspecting State Party, the Host State Party, and POE for the inspection team with date-time group of arrival, type of first inspection to be conducted, and whether intent to conduct inspection of U.S. forces has been received. Notification flow to USEUCOM elements is as follows:

a. After receipt of the Voice Format 1 message, USEUCOM JNOC will immediately re-transmit (IMMEDIATE Precedence) the notification via voice and electronic message to DoD agencies, Service Component Commands, and U.S. JTFs in the AoA.

b. The above organizations will scan for assets within the footprint of the notified POE. The footprint is one or more declared sites associated with a POE as notified in the AEI or areas in which U.S. equities are stationed. The above organizations will then notify potentially affected sites or units within the POE footprint of a possible inspection.

c. After performing the asset scan, Service Component Command centers will report either a positive or negative result to JNOC who will in turn notify DTRA-OSE Operations Center.

DTRA-OSE will deal directly with affected Service Component Command(s) to arrange for inspection coverage.

d. It is important to note that the initial notification will not name intended inspection sites; the first site to be inspected will be designated by the CFEIT after their arrival at the POE. Since the Treaty only grants up to six hours for sites/units to prepare for arrival of the inspection team after this declaration at the POE, all elements within the footprint of the POE in the initial notification need to begin preparations immediately on receipt of the initial notification.

3. **Actions at the POE.**

a. Inspectors will be met at the POE and be transported to inspection sites by Host State Party escorts. DTRA-OSE LNOs may accompany Host State Party escorts. While at the POE or following a site inspection, inspectors may designate a U.S. site for inspection. If the inspection team designates a U.S. declared site at which less than 50 per cent of the assigned TLE is present at the time of site declaration, the DTRA LNO will inform the inspection team of this status and give them the option of choosing a different site within the footprint. Should the inspection team insist on visiting this site anyway, the inspection will continue without delay. If a foreign site with U.S. equipment or facilities is chosen, the DTRA liaison team will accompany the foreign escort team to that site to insure U.S. Treaty rights are protected.

b. During inspection of the CFEIT inspection equipment at the POE by the host State Party, the DTRA-OSE LNO will stipulate that if a site with U.S. equipment or facilities is designated for inspection, the use of equipment not included in the Treaty will not be permitted when inspecting U.S. equipment or facilities even if the host State Party permits such use.

4. **CFEIT entry into the declared site.** In general, installation officials will deny CFEIT entry until expiration of the six-hour preparation time provided by the Treaty. During a challenge inspection, units and non-declared sites in the specified area will use the full six hours to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area and, when necessary, an additional four-hour delay. This additional delay is based on U.S. interpretation of the paragraph 6(C), Section VIII, POI, reference 2a(1), which authorizes delays of overflight or access to sensitive points for an additional 4 hours. Finally, CFEITs will not be allowed on any U.S. installation until a DTRA-OSE official is present to represent the USG, even after expiration of Treaty-specified time delays. The Service Component Command representative is authorized to make the following statement to the CFEIT: "Under the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection, Section II, Paragraph 5, we will not be able to begin the inspection at this time due to a delay in the arrival of the official U.S. representative." Once these conditions are met, the CFEIT may be escorted onto the installation and taken immediately to a briefing facility. In the case of a challenge inspection, the briefing may be conducted at the front gate.

5. **Site Diagram.** Before the start of declared site inspections, a site diagram and a list of sensitive points will be presented to the DTRA-OSE Escort Team Chief for information. The site commander may classify the list of sensitive points if EEFI, OPSEC, and/or force protection concerns warrant it. The site diagram without the list of sensitive points will be provided to the

CFEIT chief after arrival at the site's briefing facility. Sensitive points will not be depicted on site diagrams. After receipt of the diagram, the CFEIT chief must designate an OOV for inspection within one-half hour. The CFE Treaty specifies site diagrams requirements in paragraph 9, Section VII, POI, reference 2a(1). To add clarity to these requirements, the U.S. requires that site diagrams include the following:

- a. The name of the installation, including the location with geographic coordinates expressed in degrees, minutes, and seconds (to the nearest 10 seconds), and the total area in square kilometers;
- b. A standardized symbol consisting of a central dot intersected by and bisecting two perpendicular lines (one horizontal, one vertical) used for the reference point marking the geographic coordinates in all diagrams with an indication of true north;
- c. The boundaries of the entire site or installation following natural or man-made features to the extent possible, and including all exterior gates or entrances, firing ranges, training areas, rail loading facilities, maintenance and storage areas, and helicopter airfields;
- d. The degree of detail in depicting structures and areas should be such as to facilitate the designation of TLE locations. All buildings and areas in which TLE is routinely held should be depicted on the site diagram;
- e. Connecting roads, if the declared site has more than one part;
- f. The scale of the diagram, expressed in meters, with the date of preparation located directly below the scale;
- g. A legend, if necessary, to explain any special symbols;
- h. The diagram will be sized to show adequate detail and allow for ease of use in navigation at the site.
- i. If including an outlying associated area of the declared site, e.g., a local training area or a separately located element of an OOV, and the primary facility on a single page would unsatisfactorily diminish the utility of the diagram, the outlying area could be depicted on a second page, and if appropriate, to a different scale. The name of the separate area/OOV, an arrow depicting direction, and the distance to that separate area/OOV shall be depicted on the first page.
- j. At particularly large sites such as Grafenwoehr/Vilseck and Hohenfels, site guides may provide 1:50,000 maps or similar range map boards for use in vehicles while traveling range roads. While the inspection/escort team may use the additional maps to travel around the site, they are only to enhance navigation while on site and will be retained by site personnel.

6. **Pre-Inspection Briefing.** After designation of the OOV, a pre-inspection briefing, lasting no more than one hour including translation, will be given by site representatives to the CFEIT. In

cases where U.S. equipment is present with a Host State Party OOV at a shared site, the Host State Party, in most cases, will present the pre-inspection briefing. The U.S. site representative will provide inputs to this briefing as required. For U.S. sites, the briefing will cover the items required by paragraphs 10 and 11, Section VII, POI, reference 2a(1). General guidance includes the following:

a. Declared site pre-inspection briefings will include explanation of differences between the numbers of TLE present at the inspection site and the corresponding numbers provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the PONEI, including their origin or temporary location, as applicable. If TLE is deployed outside the AoA, a simple statement that the equipment is located outside the AoA is sufficient. Any TLE, if accounted for in the AEI and used as a static display, aircraft for ground instructional purposes, range targets, and museum pieces, should be identified/explained during the pre-inspection briefing. Service Component Commands may decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not to brief grandfathered TLE. TLE belonging to other nations that may be present on the site must be briefed.

b. For guidance on the use of equipment not in the Treaty see paragraph 6, Appendix C.

c. A pre-inspection briefing for a challenge inspection is not required by the Treaty. In the event a briefing is provided, the nature and content of challenge inspection briefings are subject to discussion by Host State Party and DTRA-OSE escorts along with affected U.S. commanders. In most cases, the Host State Party will give the briefing with some input from U.S. commanders. U.S. commanders, including those that are operating under control of a NATO command, may discuss, in general terms, off-post U.S. exercise or operational activity. These commanders will make the final determination on what the U.S. will reveal. Since declared sites are not inspectable under the terms of Section VIII, POI, reference 2a(1) and paragraph 7, Annex B, reference 2a(4), the U.S. will not give briefings or information on these declared sites within the specified area, even if the host country requests it.

7. CFE 1A Briefing Information.

a. As part of the pre-inspection briefing, the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (reference 2a(2)), known as the CFE 1A Concluding Act or CFE 1A, requires that personnel information be provided only on units, formations, or organizations reported on Charts I and III of the most recent AEI as being located at the inspection site. For the U.S., briefing charts will portray peacetime authorized and currently assigned strength. Differences will be explained.

b. In addition to the information in the subparagraph above, only a grand total of the number of personnel assigned to the site who belong to units, formations or organizations that are not reported on the most recent AEI as being located at the inspection site; e.g. detachments or separate companies, will be briefed. The intent is to provide a complete picture of the number of personnel actually assigned to the site without exceeding the level of detail required by the Treaty. This information should be clearly distinguished from that required in the paragraph above and should take the form of a statement to the effect that in addition to the 'X' personnel

belonging to the units located at the declared site, an additional 'Y' personnel who are assigned to organizations whose headquarters located elsewhere are assigned to this site.

c. All CFE 1A information will be displayed on a chart with two sections, Treaty Required Information and Additional Personnel.

(1) Treaty-Required information will have three columns with the following information:

(a) Unit/Formation. This includes those units reported in Charts I and/or III of the last AEI as being located at the inspected site.

(b) Notified Personnel. This column portrays the military personnel strength (peacetime authorized) as reported in the last AEI for the units listed in the Unit/Formation column.

(c) Assigned Personnel. This reflects the actual number of military personnel currently assigned to the units listed under the Unit/Formation column and located at the inspected site.

(2) Additional Personnel information includes those units, large or small, belonging to parent units or headquarters located at another site, not at the inspected site, or in the U.S. It is not necessary nor desirable to list every organization present and no specific breakdown of additional personnel by organization should be provided.

8. **Conduct of Inspection.** The CFEIT Chief will work primarily with DTRA-OSE Escort Team Chief in finalizing the inspection plan after the briefing. DTRA-OSE will in turn work with U.S. site personnel to facilitate the rest of the inspection based on this plan.

9. **Sequential Inspection.**

a. CFEITs will designate declared sites or specified areas for sequential inspection no later than the completion of an inspection. The DTRA-OSE Escort Team Chief will immediately notify HQ DTRA-OSE of the new inspection site/area telephonically. HQ DTRA-OSE will in turn notify HQ USEUCOM JNOC via Voice Format 3 (Declaration of a (Declared Site or Specified Area) Inspection). The same procedure outlined in paragraph 2 above will be followed for the notification of all U.S. commands and support agencies.

b. If another OOV at the same declared site as the previous inspection is selected for a sequential inspection, the CFEIT can begin the inspection within three hours of that designation.

10. **Inspection Report.** At the completion of the inspection, the CFEIT and DTRA-OSE Escort Team will prepare and sign a formal inspection report IAW Section XII, POI, reference 2a(1), and procedures agreed upon at the JCG. The DTRA-OSE Escort Team Chief will leave one copy with the Service Component Command representative.

11. **Notification of Inspection Conclusion.** DTRA-OSE escorts will telephonically notify DTRA-OSE operations of the conclusion of an inspection. DTRA-OSE Operations will in turn send a Voice Format 4 (Completion of Inspection Report) telephonically and electronically to HQ USEUCOM JNOC. After receipt of Voice Format 4, the JNOC will immediately re-transmit the notification via voice and electronic message to DoD agencies, Service Component Commands, and U.S. JTFs in the AoA.

12. **OPSEC.** While the U.S. in general has nothing to hide, all U.S. personnel will use the maximum latitude granted by the Treaty's POI and the specific policies outlined in this directive to insure OPSEC and sensitive equipment, personnel, and information are protected from CFEITs. The Service Component Command will provide their personnel the necessary guidance to comply with OPSEC requirements. Service Component Commanders will ensure their personnel and local escorts receive security awareness training prior to the inspection.

13. **Force Protection.** Service Component Commanders are responsible for the security and force protection of their installations and personnel and will provide a corresponding level of force protection for the CFEIT and DTRA-OSE escorts.

14. **Inspection Administration and Logistics.** For the purposes of this section, logistics support is limited to the requirements for transportation, communications, billeting and mess (when facilities are available on the installation), and medical arrangements to support a CFEIT, Host State Party and DTRA-OSE personnel while on-site during inspections at U.S. declared sites. For challenge inspections, the Host State Party will provide logistical and administrative support. While on U.S. locations, subject to a bilateral agreement, U.S. forces may provide some aspects of support, if available. Organizations will provide the following logistical support for CFE Treaty declared site inspections:

a. For inspections of sites greater than 20 square kilometers in area and where helicopter overflight is requested by the inspection team, Service Component Commanders will provide a helicopter with crew capable of carrying at least three passengers: two inspectors and one DTRA-OSE escort team member. If possible, a seat in the same helicopter should be provided for one host nation representative. The helicopter will be available, with six hours notice, for the duration of the inspection. Cumulative flight time during inspection will not exceed one hour. The aircraft commander will make final decision to approve or disapprove the flight based on determination that all appropriate safety procedures can be met for the proposed flight. Where Service Component Command helicopter resources are unavailable, DTRA-OSE will seek arrangements for host nation helicopter support where appropriate.

b. The Service Component Command is responsible for providing local transportation (cross-country capable where required) sufficient to transport CFEIT teams and, if necessary, sub-teams, and DTRA-OSE, Host State Party, and installation escorts, while on U.S. installations and between the installation and any associated site such as a Local Training Area. To assist in planning, the anticipated minimum requirement is six nine-passenger vehicles on-base and four cross-country vehicles, as appropriate, for the installation. Service Component Commands will coordinate with DTRA-OSE to develop alternative transportation plans wherever necessary. For

those areas of Central Europe to which DTRA-OSE escorts drive to inspection sites, their vehicles will also be available to supplement Service Component Command assets to meet the local transportation mission. The Host State Party is responsible for transporting the CFEIT to and from the U.S. declared site.

c. IAW paragraphs 24 and 25, Section VI, POI, reference 2a(1) personnel from the installation and the Service Component Commands will be available for the duration of the inspection to facilitate immediate access to buildings or areas where TLE is or could be located. This does not include areas to be designated sensitive points and to which access will be denied. Local installation escorts are responsible for indicating areas to be declared sensitive points to DTRA-OSE escorts who will declare such points to the CFEIT as necessary. Local installation escorts will also inform DTRA-OSE escorts of specific areas, facilities, or equipment which should be protected from CFEIT photography. DTRA-OSE escorts will be responsible for communicating any restrictions on photography to the CFEIT.

d. Meals will be funded by DTRA-OSE for the CFEIT and DTRA-OSE escort team for the duration of the declared site inspection, subject to the site's ability to furnish meals at military or contracted dining facilities. Meals, including carry-out, will be provided during regular dining facility operating hours. Meals may be provided in the administrative area if not disruptive to the operation of the facility. Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) are acceptable should normal meal service not be available at the time. Inspected sites will provide DTRA-OSE a detailed bill for the meals/refreshments consumed.

e. Subject to availability, the CFEIT and DTRA-OSE escort team, approximately 30 individuals, may be billeted on the installation in either the Visiting Officer Quarters (VOQ) or spare barracks building with bunks or cots. If these facilities are not available, local economy hotels may be used as an alternative. Service Component Commands will assist DTRA-OSE by identifying local economy facilities in which DTRA-OSE can contract for sufficient hotel spaces to accommodate the inspectors and escorts. DTRA-OSE will make reservations and pay for these accommodations. As a last resort Service Component Commands will consider an emergency solution such as a base gymnasium with minimum facilities; i.e., heat, shower, toilets, and cots with sleeping bags or blankets. This fallback capability must be considered in order to guarantee U.S. Treaty compliance and ensure reciprocal treatment for U.S. inspectors. The desired standard in all cases is for inspectors to be housed together with space for at least three DTRA-OSE escorts and a Host State Party representative in the same facility.

f. Service Component Commands will provide at each installation an administrative area adequate to accommodate up to a nine-person CFEIT. Furnishings will include, at a minimum, a chair for each individual and one table or desk for necessary paperwork. The administrative area is for storage of equipment and supplies, report writing, rest breaks, etc. One telephone with access to military operator, at a minimum, will be available either in the administrative area or in reasonable proximity to provide inspectors ability to contact their nearest embassy/consulate. If possible within established unit policies, it is desirable that the administrative area be at least temporarily designated a smoking area. The DTRA-OSE escort team should be provided with a separate administrative area and, if available, access to a secure telephone. This area can be

more austere than that provided for the CFEIT. Similarly, a waiting area should be made available for Host State Party escorts/drivers for the duration of the inspection on the U.S. facility as only one Host State Party escort per sub-team will accompany the CFEIT.

g. For the CFEIT, Service Component Commands will provide emergency medical care, including appropriate access to a medical facility, and medical evacuation if required, either through military means or through coordination with the local Host State Party. The emergency medical system or arrangements currently in place for U.S. personnel on each installation normally will be adequate.

h. During inspection of U.S. declared sites, Service Component Commands will supply communication means between CFEIT sub-teams. U.S. sites will also provide means for the CFEIT to communicate with its embassy.

Appendix E
Data Reporting and Notifications

1. **U.S. Policy.** U.S. Policy on data reporting and notifications is reviewed periodically. USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC will coordinate with the JS J5 CACD to ensure HQ USEUCOM has all of the policies in effect, to include changes. USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC will revise or update its guidance as necessary and forward it to the Service Component Commands.
2. **Annual Exchange of Information (AEI) Overview.** The term "Annual Exchange of Information" (AEI) broadly refers to mandatory information to be exchanged annually on 15 December, valid as of 1 January the following year, for the life of the Treaty. The most recently exchanged version of this data forms the current authoritative declaration of U.S. equipment holdings on which other Treaty obligations are based. Based on data for personnel, units, and equipment that are permanently "assigned" in the AoA, the data is considered current until the next AEI unless modified by subsequent notification(s). AEI information is formatted according to Charts I through VI as depicted in the Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, which supplements the PONEI, reference 2a(1).
3. **AEI Policy.** The PONEI and references 3a, 4d(7), and 4d(8) provide instructions on what to report and how to format the data. The following notes further clarify those instructions.
 - a. In general, numbers of equipment and personnel permanently assigned to U.S. ground, air, and air defense forces are reportable under the provisions of the CFE Treaty. Numbers of naval equipment and personnel are not.
 - b. IAW USG policy (reference 4c(9)), strategic bombers (B52, B1, B2), naval, and USMC aircraft are not covered by the CFE Treaty and therefore are not reportable in the AEI under any circumstances. USMC ground TLE, if it enters the AoA and stays longer than seven days, is reportable.
 - c. TLE in the AoA for seven days or less is considered "in transit" and is not reflected in the AEI.
 - d. By contrast, TLE that enters the AoA and stays longer than seven days does count and will be reflected in the AEI or the annual F24/F25 notifications submitted coincident with the AEI, as appropriate. It is imperative, therefore, that Service Component Commanders, U.S. JTF, and U.S. commanders of forces serving in NATO led operations track this data and provide it to HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC IAW this appendix.
 - e. Chart II of the USG AEI will include all U.S. TLE that is permanently assigned to units in the AoA and that which is expected to be temporarily present on 1 January. A footnote will be added to explain which pieces of TLE-by category and type-are temporarily present.
 - f. Chart III will include a footnote explaining that USEUCOM totals include temporarily present TLE.

g. Information on the location of declared sites from which all CAEST has been removed will be reported in the Notification Format 19, Appendix A, reference 4b. Information will be provided for three years following the withdrawal. See Annex C, paragraph 11 for additional information.

h. TLE that enters into service with U.S. forces in the AoA during the previous 12 months will be reported in the Notification Format 22, Appendix A, reference 4b, while TLE that is removed from such service is reported in the Notification Format 23, Appendix A, reference 4b.

i. Physical destruction below reduction levels will be reported in the Notification Format F23, Appendix A, reference 4b, annual notification. See Appendix F for further requirements.

j. Remarks for annual notifications (Notification Formats F24 and F25, Appendix A, reference 4b) will clarify which TLE entries/exits are or are not reflected in the AEI.

(1) The content block of the F24 will report TLE that entered the AoA in the previous 12 months. Remarks will note TLE that did not affect the AEI because it was either previously reported as permanently assigned or was temporarily present in the AoA or is present on 1 January. New permanently assigned TLE which affects the AEI will also be noted.

(2) The content block of the F25 will report all TLE removed from the AoA in the previous 12 months that remains outside the AoA on 1 January. Remarks will note by category and type the numbers of TLE still held by formations in the AoA, TLE that was temporarily present in the AoA, and TLE permanently transferred outside the AoA during the previous 12 months.

(3) The F25 will include the last reported location of TLE. If the TLE was never formally reported at a unit or location it will not have a last reported location. "Not Applicable" will be entered on the notification and a remark will be added to the affect the TLE does not have a last reported location.

(4) F24/25 remarks may include TLE that corresponds to a previous year's F24/25. For example, F25 remarks will identify TLE that was reported on a prior F24 that then left the AoA in the previous 12 months.

4. **AEI Procedures and Responsibilities.**

a. Service Component Commands will submit data for the AEI via CMTS (or the designated arms control information and notification system) to HQ USEUCOM in mid-July and mid-November each year. For the November submission, HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC will disseminate specific dates and requirements in a formal tasking message. By early December HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC will host a conference to review the data, compile a Line-by-Line Change Report, and prepare the data for submission to the JS. At the direction of HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC, Service Component Commands will submit unofficial data at other specified times in order to insure currency of data and to exercise the CMTS software (or the

designated arms control information and notification system) and the AEI submission process. In addition to those units under Service Component Command or HQ USEUCOM command, other agencies operate within the AoA whose elements are put into Service “stovepipes” for data reporting purposes. Complete distribution of reporting responsibilities follows:

(1) Director, USEUCOM ECJ1: Personnel numbers for USEUCOM headquarters billets, including the subunified commands (SOCEUR, USFORAZ, and ICEDEFOR). ECJ1 will also liaison with ECRA to provide personnel strength on Reservists who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service for a continuous period of more than 90 days, working at HQ USEUCOM, and not reported by other directorates; DMDC to provide personnel strength data on military personnel assigned to Joint Activities and Defense Agencies within the AoA; and USNMR NATO to provide personnel strength on U.S. military personnel assigned to NATO units in the AoA.

(2) Director, USEUCOM ECRA: Personnel numbers on Reservists who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service for a continuous period of more than 90 days, working at HQ USEUCOM, and not reported by other directorates.

(3) COMUSAFE: All USAF units and personnel, to include Air Force Reservists who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service for a continuous period of more than 90 days, not reported by Director, USEUCOM ECJ1. Track and report numbers of combat aircraft temporarily deployed into the AoA from outside by type/location. Also report temporarily deployed combat aircraft by type/location that is projected to be present in the Treaty AoA on 1 January.

(4) CGUSAREUR/7A: All USAREUR/7A units, USAREUR/7A tenant units and activities, U.S. Army forces temporarily deployed to the AoA, and personnel, to include Army Reservists who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service for a continuous period of more than 90 days, not reported by Director, USEUCOM ECJ1. Tenants units include but are not limited to the 5th Signal Command, Intelligence and Security Command, Army Regional Medical/Dental components, Army Reserve, Army Material Command, and Combat Equipment Group Europe. Also report U.S. Army temporarily deployed TLE by type/location that is projected to be present in the AoA on 1 January.

(5) COMUSNAVEUR: Navy Storage (Norway), numbers by category/type/location of Fleet Marine Force ground TLE that disembarks into the AoA and remains for seven days or more. Also report temporarily deployed Fleet Marine Force ground TLE projected to be present on 1 January.

(6) COMMARFOREUR: Personnel not reported by Director, USEUCOM ECJ1, and CAEST numbers for subordinate commands and pre-positioned equipment that are land-based within the AoA. For ground equipment track and report numbers of USMC TLE by category/type/location that is assigned to units in the AoA or that enters the AoA and remains for seven days or more. Also report temporarily deployed ground TLE by category/type/location that is projected to be present on 1 January. Coordinate with USNAVEUR to facilitate their

reporting of Fleet Marine Force TLE. Additionally, MARFOREUR will report on the assigned strength of USMC personnel performing guard duty at embassies in the AoA.

(7) Commander, JTF: Ensure subordinate units report personnel and CAEST to their appropriate Service Component Commands.

(8) Director, DLA-E: Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service International (DRMS-I) is responsible for disposition of excess DoD materials. The DLA-E LNO at USEUCOM ECJ4 provides a listing of TLE items to DRMS-I annually so that assigned DRMS-I activities can ensure these items are not accepted and to check for on-hand items. While DRMS-I policy is to not accept TLE for disposal, on-hand stocks are reviewed annually to determine if any TLE items have been received. The results of this review are provided to the DLA-E LNO at USEUCOM ECJ4 for inclusion in required reports.

b. At the completion of the November data review, HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC will merge necessary data and notifications and submit a data package to the JS. HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC will send a copy of the Line-by-Line Change Report with the data to explain year-to-year changes. After Service department headquarters coordination, JS will approve final data.

5. **Notifications.** All changes to AEI data which occur periodically throughout the year, as well as inspection related notifications, are broadly referred to as Treaty notifications.

a. The notifications will be generated in the CMTS (or the designated arms control information and notification system) by the organizations responsible for the action(s) that trigger the requirement(s) for the notifications. The notifications will then be forwarded for approval to the next level in the approval hierarchy that is responsible for ensuring Treaty compliance. Notifications will be forwarded to HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC for approval, and, in turn, sent to the JS and the DoS for validation and transmittal to other CFE State Parties.

b. For purposes of computing 10 percent changes for Section VIII, PONEI, reference 2a(1), calculations will not be rounded off. For example, 9.95 percent will not be rounded off to 10 percent.

c. Tab 1 to Appendix E assigns responsibility and timelines for these notifications. More specific instructions on notification management can be found in reference 4b.

6. **Flank Exemptions.** Within the NATO countries of Norway, Iceland, Greece, and Turkey (with the exception of the Turkish territory outside the AoA), NATO nations may deploy on a temporary basis TLE in excess of normal zonal limits, subject to the following ceilings: 459 battle tanks, 723 ACVs, and 420 pieces of artillery. The maximum TLE which could be deployed to any single country of those listed above is: 153 battle tanks, 241 ACVs, and 140 pieces of artillery. These deployments require approval and notification. Notification Format CFE F1, Appendix A, reference 4b, must be provided to HQ USEUCOM at least 75 days prior to the deployment if Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBM) IAW Vienna Document 99 notification is also required; 30 days prior if no CSBM notification is required.

Tab 1 To Appendix E
CFE Treaty Notifications

FORMAT	EVENT	SUSPENSE	ORIGIN	CRD/APP	APPROVE
F00	CORRECT AEI, CLOSE OOV, MISC.	TREATY: 42 DAYS FOR OOV CLOSURE	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC EUCOM	JS DoS
F1	TEMP DEPLOYMENT IN EXCESS OF FLANK AGGREGATES	EUCOM: 75 DAYS IF CSBM NOTIF REQ, 30 DAYS IF NO CSBM REQ TREATY: NLT DEPLOYMENT START	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR USJTF	HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC EUCOM	JS DoS
F2	WITHDRAWAL OF TLE IN EXCESS OF FLANK AGGREGATES	EUCOM: W/IN 10 DAYS OF WITHDRAWL TREATY: +2 DAYS AFTER COMPLETION	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR USJTF	HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC EUCOM	JS DoS
F3	CHANGE IN MAX LEVELS FOR HOLDINGS	EUCOM: 120 DAYS PRIOR TREATY: 90 DAYS PRIOR	USAREUR USAFE	HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC EUCOM	JS DoS
F4	CHANGE IN MAX HOLDING BY AREA	SAME AS ABOVE	USAREUR USAFE	HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC EUCOM	JS DoS
F6	INCREASE IN HOLDINGS NOT EXCEEDING MAX LEVELS	EUCOM: 30 DAYS	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC EUCOM	JS DoS
F13	ENTRY INTO SERVICE OF NEW TYPES, MODELS, OR VERSION OF TLE	EUCOM: NLT 30 DAYS PRIOR TO ENTRY TREATY: NLT ENTRY TO AOA	HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC	EUCOM	JS DoS

FORMAT	EVENT	SUSPENSE	ORIGIN	CRD/APP	APPROVE
F19	INFO OF SITE PREVIOUSLY NOTIFIED AS DECLARED SITES	AEI FOR 3 YEARS FOLLOWING CHANGE	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F20	PERM CHANGE IN ORG STATUS	EUCOM: 60 DAYS PRIOR TREATY: 42 DAYS PRIOR	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F21	CHANGE OF 10% IN ASSIGNED HOLDINGS	TREATY: NLT 5 WORKING DAYS AFTER CHANGE OCCURS	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F22	AGGREGATE INFO ON EQUIP ENTERING INTO SERVICE DURING LAST 12 MONTHS	AEI	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F23	AGGREGATE INFO ON EQUIP REMOVED FROM SERVICE DURING LAST 12 MONTHS	AEI	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F24	AGGREGATE INFO ON EQUIP ENTERING AOA IN LAST 12 MONTHS	AEI	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F25	AGGREGATE INFO ON EQUIP LEAVING / REMAINING OUT OF AOA IN LAST 12 MONTHS	AEI	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F26	AMENDMENT TO LIST INSPECTORS/TRANSPORT CREW		DTRA		DoS
F27	DELETIONS FROM LIST INSPECTORS/TRANSPORT CREW		DTRA		DoS
F28	CHANGES TO POE	TREATY: NLT 90 DAYS PRIOR	EUCOM		JS
F29	INTENT TO INSPECT DS/SA	TREATY: NLT 36 HOURS	DTRA		DoS
F31	COPY OF NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO INSPECT	TREATY: WITHIN 3 HOURS OF F29	NRRC		

FORMAT	EVENT	SUSPENSE	ORIGIN	CRD/APP	APPROVE
F32	NEW ARRIVAL TIME FOR INSPECTION TEAM		DTRA		
F37	INFO ON TLE AWAITING EXPORT/RE-EXPORT		USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	EUCOM	JS DoS
F38	REVISION OF NATL PERS LIMIT		HQDA HQAF CNO HQMC	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOR EUCOM	JS DoS
F39	PERM INCREASE IN UNIT STRENGTH		USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOREUR	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOR EUCOM	JS DoS
F40	CALL UP RESERVE PERS		EUCOM	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOR EUCOM	JS
F41	RESUBORD OF UNITS		EUCOM	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOR EUCOM	JS
F42	PLANNED EXCLUSION OF PERS SERVING WITH RESUBORD FORMATIONS FROM SCOPE OF LIMITATIONS		EUCOM	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR MARFOR EUCOM	

Formats not listed are no longer applicable to USEUCOM

Appendix F

Equipment Disposal

1. **GENERAL**. The U.S. no longer has a reduction liability. However, the U.S. may choose to further reduce its TLE holdings within the AoA through physical destruction or modification for other use of TLE, or TLE may be reduced due to accident. So as not to confuse Treaty terms, the process involving planned physical destruction, modification for other use, or destruction as the result of an accident of TLE when there is no reduction liability will be referred to herein as disposal. Since the Treaty does not require any specific inspection or notification for disposal of equipment, this appendix provides the only written guidance on accomplishing these disposals and making the proper notifications.

2. **POLICY**.

a. Disposal of TLE can be accomplished by:

(1) Physical destruction (Reduction Protocol, Sections III through VII or Appendix A, references 2b(2), 2b(3), 2b(6), 2b(8), 2b(10), or 2b(12)).

(2) Destruction as the result of an accident (Reduction Protocol, Section IX).

(3) Modification for other use (Reduction Protocol, Sections X through XII).

b. Disposals will be notified on the annual Notification Format F23, Appendix A, reference 4b. See paragraph 3i, Appendix E, for additional guidance on the F23.

c. Disposals not covered in paragraph 2a above will be handled on a case-by-case basis.

d. In addition to any other notifications, Notification Format F21, Appendix A, reference 4b, will be issued announcing 10 per cent reduction in holdings for particular unit(s) if appropriate.

Appendix G
Command Relationships

1. **GENERAL.**

a. Purpose. To establish the relationships, for purposes of CFE Treaty implementation, between:

- (1) DoD,
- (2) JS,
- (3) Service Headquarters,
- (4) COMUSEUCOM,
- (5) Other Unified and Specified Commanders,
- (6) DoD Agencies in the Treaty AoA,
- (7) Service Component Commanders,
- (8) USEUCOM Subunified commands
- (9) Commanders of U.S. single-service forces and JTFs, subordinate to NATO commands or to U.S. Combatant Commands.
- (10) U.S. Diplomatic Missions and U.S. Defense Representatives, and
- (11) DTRA

b. Scope. COMUSEUCOM is designated the Secretary of Defense's Executive Agent for CFE Treaty implementation. This ED, and the command relationships outlined in it, apply to any and all DoD organizations with forces, equipment, locations, premises or activities in the Treaty AoA, whether permanently assigned or temporarily present, or whether their forces or TLE are in, transiting, entering, or exiting the AoA. The relationship is effective for planning and applies particularly to the Treaty specific functions of receiving inspectors at sites where U.S. forces, equipment, locations, premises or activity are located, as well as to reporting the presence of CAEST. The relationship will continue indefinitely, for the life of the Treaty, unless altered.

2. **COMMAND LINES.** Service Component Commands, SOCEUR, USFORAZ, and ICEDEFOR are under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of COMUSEUCOM.

3. **SUPPORT AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS.**

a. Coordinating Authorities.

(1) Unified and Specified Commands, DoD Agencies (except DTRA), Commanders of U.S. single-service forces and JTFs subordinate to NATO Commands. For the purposes of CFE Treaty information exchange, change notifications to information exchanges, notification of impending inspections, receiving and hosting inspection teams, reduction requirements, and all other CFE Treaty requirements, the aforementioned organizations will report to and operate under the direction of COMUSEUCOM or the appropriate USEUCOM Service Component Commander unless directed otherwise.

(2) The relationship between USEUCOM and DTRA is established in a MOU.

b. USCINCEUR-OSIA-USCINCLANT Memorandum of Understanding (reference 5a). This document guides the relationship between USEUCOM, DTRA (formerly OSIA, and USJFCOM (formerly USLANTCOM) for receiving CFE Treaty inspections.

c. Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies and U.S. Defense Representatives. U.S. Defense Representatives will coordinate with HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC concerning CFE Treaty inspections of U.S. forces, equipment, locations, premises, and activity, and take direction from HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-T-AC for receiving inspections, as required. U.S. Defense Representatives may also be requested to assist in exchanging CFE Treaty related data as needed.

3. **PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS.** All organizations are authorized direct coordination with DTRA-OSE concerning training and preparation for CFE Treaty inspections of their sites or activities.