

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
UNIT 30400, BOX 1000  
APO 09128

DIRECTIVE  
NUMBER 56-15

11 August 1998

**PLANS AND POLICY**

Implementation Plan for the Chemical Weapons Convention

---

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary.....	1
Applicability.....	1
Suggested Improvements .....	1
Internal Control Systems .....	1
References .....	1
Terms and Background .....	3
Organization .....	3
Responsibilities.....	5
JCS	5
OSIA	5
HQ USEUCOM Chief of Staff	6
HQ USEUCOM J5-F	6
HQ USEUCOM ECJ33	6
HQ USEUCOM Public Affairs/ECPA	7
USEUCOM Component Commands	7
Guidance and Planning Factors.....	8
General	8
Funding	9
Billeting	9
Messing	9
Public Affairs	10
Security and Counterintelligence	10
Communications	10
Transportation	11
Medical Care	12
Access	12
Equipment	14
Point of Entry	15

TABLE OF CONTENTS  
(continued)

Appendix A Abbreviations.....	A-1
Appendix B Counterintelligence.....	B-1
Appendix C Physical and Operations Security.....	C-1
Appendix D Notification Checklists.....	D-1
Appendix E OSIA CWC Notification Checklists .....	E-1
Appendix F Specific Area Guidance .....	F-1

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
UNIT 30400, BOX 1000  
APO 09128

DIRECTIVE  
NUMBER 56-15

**PLANS AND POLICY**

Implementation Plan for the Chemical Weapons Convention

---

1. **Summary.** This plan establishes policies, procedures and responsibilities for receiving challenge inspections under Article IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It explains the command relationship between organizations; provides guidance and planning factors to Headquarters, U.S. European Command (HQ USEUCOM) and component commands; lists agency responsibilities; explains notification requirements; and provides public affairs guidance.

2. **Applicability.**

a. This directive applies to HQ USEUCOM staff agencies, USEUCOM component commands, and DoD agencies.

b. This directive applies only to challenge inspections executed under Article IX of reference (a).

3. **Suggested Improvements.** HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-F is the proponent for this directive. Agencies with recommended changes to this plan should coordinate them through parent USEUCOM Component Commands to HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-F, Unit 30400, Box 1000, APO AE 09128. Users may also call DSN 430-5438/7445.

4. **Internal Control Systems.** This Directive contains internal control provisions and is subject to the requirements of the internal management control program. For HQ USEUCOM and subordinate joint activities, the applicable internal control directive is ED 50-8, Internal Management Control Program.

5. **References.**

a. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 13 January, 1993.

b. DoD Planning Guidance for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 January, 1997.

c. Joint Staff Memorandum, CWC Implementation and Compliance Guidance, 29 January, 1998.

d. DoD Public Affairs Plan for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 January, 1997.

## 6. Terms and Background.

a. See abbreviations and glossary listed in Appendix A.

b. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), is a multilateral treaty signed 13-15 January 1993 in Paris. It is the most intrusive treaty, in terms of verification, that the U.S. has signed to date. The CWC prohibits a wide range of chemical weapons (CW) related activities. In general, each State Party to the CWC agrees never to: develop, produce, acquire, store, or retain CW; transfer CW to anyone; engage in military preparations to use CW; assist or encourage anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the CWC; or use herbicides or riot control agents as a method of warfare. Within ten years after entry-into-force (EIF), each State Party to the CWC must destroy all CW it possesses as well as any CW production facilities it designed, built, or used since 1946.

c. The CWC contains a comprehensive verification regime involving extensive data declarations and a combination of routine and challenge inspections designed to provide data on compliance by State Parties. USEUCOM has no CW production facilities or permanent CW storage facilities to declare under this agreement, therefore USEUCOM is not vulnerable to routine inspection. However, all USEUCOM sites within the territory of a ratifying state are subject to challenge inspections at any time after EIF.

d. Implementation procedures outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) are different than ones in CONUS. Major differences are:

(1) Escort roles will be shared between the resident host country verification agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). Specific responsibilities will be organized in host country agreements, including point-of-entry (POE) procedures, equipment checks, and International Inspection Team (IIT) escort roles.

(2) USEUCOM may act as the U.S. host team leader, as delegated by the Joint Staff.

(3) A single inspection may encompass areas outside of U.S. control and must, therefore, be managed in concert with the host nation.

(4) CONUS based host team members and support teams may not be able to arrive at the site before the inspection team arrival at the POE.

## 7. Organization .

a. National Authority (NA). The CWC mandates that every signatory country establish a single point of contact, a NA, for CWC related matters. For the U.S., the NA is Department of State (DOS), responsible to the President, through the National Security Council, for

compliance with the CWC. The administrative functions of the NA are carried out by the Office of the National Authority (ONA) located in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. ONA has broad authority and jurisdiction to require accomplishment of compliance related activities by any individual or organization. A flag rank or equivalent from JS/OSD will act as the national authority representative for those challenge inspections where the Department of Defense (DoD) is designated as the lead agent.

b. Department of Defense. Responsibility for ensuring DoD compliance with CWC rests with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Matters (OATSD(NCB)). DoD has established a Compliance Review Group (CRG) which sets DoD policy for compliance and will monitor any challenge inspections of DoD facilities.

c. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Provides policy and operational guidance to CINCs and the Services, and are responsible for ensuring continuity of policy for all DoD components. In conjunction with OSD, acts as the national authority representative and host team leader at all challenge inspections, unless further delegated, at which the DoD is designated as the lead agency.

d. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). OSIA provides national escorts for all inspections at U.S. military facilities; escorts the IIT once they are on a U.S. controlled site; meets all arriving inspectors in company with the host nation; conducts technical equipment inspections (TEI) at the POE; arranges for messing and berthing of the IIT at inspection sites.

e. HQ USEUCOM J5. Acts as USCINCEUR representative and USEUCOM point of contact for CWC compliance. The Arms Control and NATO Adaptation Division (HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-F) has day-to-day responsibility for USEUCOM implementation and compliance activities and interface with other DoD, national, or international organizations involved in the process. Coordinates with State Department (DOS) to provide theater expertise in host nation agreement negotiations. Assigned responsibility for Compliance Certification and Compliance Review IAW reference (c).

f. USEUCOM Component Commands. Responsible for ensuring commanders at all USEUCOM sites assign agents or Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) with broad responsibilities for site-unique preparation and compliance with the CWC; ensuring personnel at USEUCOM sites are aware of their rights and responsibilities in the event of an on-site challenge inspection; developing specific CW arms control compliance plans; ensuring personnel at affected sites receive inspection notifications; annually exercising notification and compliance plans.

g. Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). International organization responsible for conducting inspections worldwide. IIT members are recruited from CWC ratifying countries and enjoy diplomatic status and limited diplomatic privileges. Detailed information on this organization is available at <http://www.opcw.nl>.

h. US Host Team. IAW reference (b), the U.S. host team will consist of representatives from all DoD agencies that have equities involved in the inspection. This group consists of representatives from JS/OSD, USEUCOM, the affected service/component, the OSIA escort team chief, and the challenge inspection site commander. For OCONUS challenge inspections, the JS/OSD role may be delegated to the CINC representative, IAW reference (c). All decisions of the host team are reached by consensus, or else the decision is sent up the respective chains of command to the next highest level for resolution.

i. Site Commander. The site commander is responsible for the safety and security of his command. Nothing in this directive requires or relieves him of this responsibility. The site commander sits on the U.S. host team to ensure he can carry out these responsibilities.

## 8. Responsibilities.

### a. JCS will (included for information only):

(1) represent the U.S. military in the U.S. Government (USG) interagency decision making process;

(2) provide policy guidance to USEUCOM, as required;

(3) coordinate with the services and establish U.S. military policy for implementing the CWC;

(4) serve as the POC for issue resolution with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), OSIA, and DOS;

(5) in conjunction with OSD, act as the host team leader for all challenge inspections, or delegate this responsibility to the CINC on a case by case basis;

(6) coordinate with USEUCOM to facilitate establishing host nation agreements.

### b. OSIA will (included for information only):

(1) upon notification of a challenge inspection in USEUCOM AOR, initiate conference call to notify principal DoD commands;

(2) perform national escort team functions on U.S. controlled sites for CWC challenge inspections in USEUCOM;

(3) perform/monitor POE procedures in conjunction with the host nation escort team;

(4) coordinate provisions for logistical and administrative support to the inspection team.

c. HQ USEUCOM Chief of Staff (CoS) will, upon notification of a CWC challenge inspection, select a USEUCOM delegate to the host team. If USEUCOM is tasked to act as the host team leader, this officer must be a general or flag officer, or else a waiver for this requirement should be initiated.

d. HQ USEUCOM J5-F will:

(1) be the theater point of contact for CWC issues;

(2) conduct CWC indoctrination training and periodic updates to the officers identified by the USEUCOM CoS in 8.c.;

(3) provide CWC policy and guidance to USEUCOM Component Commands and units over which it has CWC authority;

(4) when a challenge inspection is declared:

(a) ensure notification of component commands of pending CWC challenge inspection, including relevant data from the notification conference call, and any other U.S. government personnel expected to participate in the inspection;

(b) contact the Joint Staff and determine who will lead the host team;

(c) brief the designated general/flag officer who will lead the host team and assign an officer to act as the host team leader's assistant;

(5) maintain this plan and coordinate changes to the plan with all affected agencies;

(6) certify USEUCOM CWC compliance to the Joint Staff as required by reference (c);

(7) serve as the POC and liaison between the component command/responsible unit and Joint Staff/OSD for coordination of all activities necessary to facilitate an inspection;

(8) coordinate CWC mock inspections in theater;

(9) recommend a candidate for host team representative to the USEUCOM Chief of Staff (8.c above).

e. HQ USEUCOM ECJ33 (EA Cell) will:

(1) when notified of a CWC challenge inspection by a host nation, immediately relay the information in accordance with HQ USEUCOM-CWC Checklist # 4 in Appendix D;

(2) when notified of a CWC challenge inspection by OSIA, immediately execute HQ USEUCOM-CWC Checklist #1 in Appendix D;

(3) execute HQ USEUCOM-CWC Checklists #2 and #3 as required as additional voice format messages are received.

f. HQ USEUCOM Public Affairs/ECPA will:

(1) execute the public affairs guidance plan in ref. (d).

(2) coordinate public affairs releases regarding inspections of U.S. installations with the host nation embassy, OSIA , and any other agencies, as required.

g. USEUCOM Component Commands will:

(1) organize, train, and equip subordinate forces to receive CWC challenge inspections;

(2) submit CWC Compliance Plans to HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-F for approval. After approval, forward a final copy to HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-F for reference and any changes thereafter;

(3) develop procedures necessary to receive CWC challenge inspection notification, rapidly inform affected installations/units, including all tenant commands, and provide support for the challenged site;

(4) when multiple units within one challenged site are affected, designate a lead unit that will be primarily responsible for accomplishment of all appropriate unit actions;

(5) ensure planning guides support delivery of the Army mobile CWC field lab at the site;

(6) ensure any special OPSEC concerns at the site are passed on to the host team;

(7) coordinate any media releases with HQ USEUCOM/ECPA and provide supplemental PA guidance to units as necessary;

(8) at least annually, exercise notification procedures and review installation inspection execution plans;

(9) evaluate the feasibility of canceling or postponing previously scheduled or ongoing activities at the affected site;

(10) collect and review expenditure claims directly or indirectly attributable to the challenge inspection. Forward the certified expenditures report to HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-F within 30 days for reimbursement from the OSIA;

(11) plan for an OSIA-EO liaison officer to coordinate logistical requirements in the inspection operations center.

## 9. Guidance and Planning Factors.

### a. General.

(1) There are two overriding national level objectives to successfully hosting a CWC challenge inspection at a USEUCOM installation:

- (a) demonstrate compliance with CWC provisions.
- (b) protect sensitive information.

(2) In addition, USEUCOM has several requirements that are implicit elements of command responsibility and prudent leadership:

- (a) minimize operational impact, as allowed by the Verification Annex in ref. (c).
- (b) ensure the safety of inspection participants and non-involved personnel.
- (c) apply resources prudently while facilitating the inspection process.

(3) All USEUCOM sites are potentially vulnerable to on-site challenge inspections. Although challenge inspections will be rare events, they will have high international visibility and will be conducted following a defined timeline and sequence of events.

(4) The challenge inspection process does not conflict with any national level objectives or USEUCOM responsibilities. Properly trained, prepared, and motivated individuals can accomplish all inspection procedures within the framework of the CWC by maintaining cognizance of the timelines and provisions of the CWC Verification Annex.

(5) An inspection is judged successful when all host state actions required by the CWC are accomplished; the IIT is granted access to the maximum extent possible; national security and proprietary information and constitutional rights are preserved; no evidence supporting a claim of non-compliance is uncovered; and, if less than full access is granted, every reasonable effort is made to demonstrate compliance with the CWC.

(6) USEUCOM unit/installation commanders are responsible for reconciling CWC challenge inspection requirements with other real world and day-to-day activities, giving due regard to the national and USEUCOM objectives outlined above.

(7) During a CWC challenge inspection, the host team has considerable latitude in responding to an inspector's request by taking actions that may be necessary to protect sensitive information. In particular, all access granted and inspection activities conducted are subject to negotiation. It is important to provide full access whenever possible and to be responsive to IIT requests for information in order to help inspectors determine that an inspected site is in full compliance. At the same time, the CWC does not require unlimited access.

(8) During challenge inspections, USEUCOM facilities must also be prepared to accommodate an observer appointed by the challenging state. Although the rights of the observer differ from those of the IIT, he/she will also have diplomatic status.

b. Funding.

(1) OSIA will provide funding for all IIT and observer amenities, communications, transportation, lodging, meals, and medical care, although the IIT may elect to pay some or all of these expenses themselves.

(2) Any other direct or indirect costs incurred as a result of the challenge inspection not immediately reimbursed by OSIA will be compiled by the component command and submitted to ECJ5-F for forwarding to OSIA. There is no specified format for this report, but it will be released at least at the component command division level.

c. Billeting.

(1) Every effort will be made to billet the IIT, observer, and national escort team at the same facility on base or in government contract lodging. Every reasonable effort will be made to obtain billeting outside of the requested perimeter. If this is not possible, however, the host team may authorize billeting inside the requested perimeter.

(2) OSIA will be responsible for arranging inspection team, observer, and national escort team billeting. The inspected component will arrange billeting for the host team and component escorts.

d. Messing.

(1) USEUCOM dining facilities should support the IIT, observer, and national escorts during normal service hours. Dining facilities may provide meals once perimeter access has been granted. The location and timing of meal service will be negotiated. Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) are acceptable for personnel securing the site and their national escorts, but due

recognition should be made to the fact that they will normally be treated as distinguished visitors. Logistic support to feed the IIT and national escorts around the clock may be required during the inspection period. If meals are not available through USEUCOM facilities, unit may provide food service through the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, or commercial concessionaires.

(2) If the IIT is billeted off base, messing support may be reduced to providing box lunches or MREs to perimeter monitoring teams and a mid-day meal for the IIT, observer, and national escorts during actual inspection activity.

(3) In all cases, an early determination should be made as to whether there are any special religious food preparation or eating constraints posed by IIT members.

(4) While OSIA retains responsibility for IIT amenities, the inspected component will coordinate with OSIA in providing meals to the IIT and escorts. The inspected component is also responsible for coordinating messing for the host team and component escorts.

e. Public Affairs.

(1) CWC challenge inspections have significant public impact, drawing major international media attention. In addition, visits of IIT to bases will generate considerable regional and local media interest.

(2) USEUCOM component commands will coordinate any media releases with HQ USEUCOM/ECPA.

f. Counterintelligence and Security. See Appendix B and Appendix C.

g. Communications.

(1) Upon request, units will give the OSIA or any other official host team member (i.e. the representative of the National Authority, the national escort team chief, or other official U.S. government personnel) access to available USEUCOM communications at the inspection site.

(2) During CWC challenge inspections, units will provide the IIT with the ability to communicate with the OPCW. The CWC challenging state observer will also be provided with the ability to communicate with his/her in-country embassy or consulate, generally using a non-secure line at the site.

(3) The IIT conducting a CWC challenge inspection is authorized to use its own approved two-way radios for communication between perimeter patrols and other IIT members, provided they are approved in the technical equipment inspection. As soon as

possible after the initial notification, the host unit at the inspection site must determine inspector radio operating frequencies and coordinate these frequencies as part of the inspection plan negotiation process.

h. Transportation.

(1) The host nation will be responsible for arranging IIT and observer transportation from the POE to the site, unless other arrangements have been made in a particular host country agreement.

(2) The host nation and OSIA will be responsible for arranging transportation between the POE and the inspection site for the official inspection party and their equipment. USEUCOM component commands should be prepared to render assistance in planning logistical arrangements if the OSIA escorts are delayed. Component Commands are also responsible for all official transportation requirements supporting the IIT, observer, and national escorts while on U.S. government controlled facilities.

(3) Inspectors may conduct inspection activity on foot, by cross-country vehicle, helicopter, or a combination of methods of transportation. The lead component will be responsible for providing and operating appropriate cross-country-vehicles and helicopters (if available and approved) during inspections of USEUCOM sites.

(4) Aerial overflight information is references in Appendix F. Though discouraged, if helicopter inspection overflights are conducted, the aircraft commander will:

(a) carry, in addition to IIT members, a national escort and installation representative;

(b) allow IIT inspection chief access to approved communication equipment;

(c) be the final authority for safety of flight decisions;

(d) comply with all air traffic control restrictions, and any other applicable safety provisions, while conducting inspection flights.

(5) Units will accommodate official transportation requirements for the IIT, observer, and national escort team to the maximum extent possible. In some cases, it may be necessary to rent vehicles to ensure that off-base requirements are met. If vehicles are obtained for the inspection party off-base use, arrangements will be coordinated with OSIA and costs will be assumed by OSIA.

(6) If at any time the unit determines that it cannot meet inspection transportation requirements, it will notify its applicable component command headquarters and request assistance.

i. Medical Care.

(1) The IIT, observer, and national escorts conducting challenge inspections of U.S. facilities will be provided any emergency health care required on a 24-hour per day basis.

(2) Care beyond the capability of the installation medical treatment facility (MTF) may be provided through referral by the installation MTF to a DoD MTF or, if none are available, provided by the host nation. Although the U.S. retains responsibility for providing or arranging for transportation between the treatment facilities, this may be provided by the host nation, upon prior coordination, as circumstances dictate.

(3) In the event no U.S. MTFs are available, coordination among the US host team, health service support personnel, and host nation will be required.

(4) In the event an IIT member or observer becomes seriously ill, aeromedical evacuation to the POE will be arranged by USEUCOM Joint Medical Regulating Office. Movement should be provided when the individual is in stable condition and can safely be transported.

(5) Reimbursements for treatment at USEUCOM MTFs and Dental Treatment Facilities will be in accordance with AR 40-330, AFR 168-6/AFR 168-10 and NAVMEDCOMINST 6320.1A. OSIA will pay for all medical and aeromedical evacuation costs incurred by the IIT or observer. Accurate accounting of all costs involved in health care support of the IIT and observer will be provided to OSIA. Details of questions arising from costs incurred will be addressed by USEUCOM/ECJ5-F.

(6) The U.S. host team and host nation will arrange for mortuary services for any deceased inspection team personnel, or observer, in accordance with the applicable host nation Status of Forces Agreements or other host nation arrangements.

j. Access.

(1) Site access for the IIT will be determined by the host team, and could be delayed up to 108 hours from IIT arrival at the POE to allow adequate safety and security concerns to be addressed.

(2) The IIT has the following obligations while conducting a challenge inspection. They are expected to:

(a) respect the laws and regulations of the host government and of the United States on DoD facilities;

(b) follow all safety regulations at the inspected site;

- (c) not hamper or delay operations at the inspected facility;
- (d) not interfere with the internal affairs of the U.S. or the host state.
- (e) not undertake professional or commercial activities anywhere within the host state;

(3) The IIT has the following rights, limited by the scope of their inspection mandate, while conducting a challenge inspection:

(a) access, as agreed, to the inspection site, and equipment and buildings within it. A national escort team will be present during inspection of all USEUCOM sites, structures, or premises;

(b) to request the facility perform operations the inspectors consider necessary to fulfill their mandate;

(c) to review documents and records relevant to the inspection mandate, as negotiated with the host team;

(d) to request clarification, photos, and samples. Appendix F references guidelines for photos and samples;

(e) to interview facility personnel. The U.S. will have a representative present during the interviews as well as during all other inspection activities. Units will be prepared to record interviews to ensure that questions and answers are properly and completely documented. Appendix F references further guidelines;

(f) to communicate with the OPCW. The IIT may use its own communication devices for this purpose or may request access to local telecommunications.

(4) USEUCOM personnel will respect the IITs and observer's privileges and immunities at all times. Their persons, living quarters, office premises, approved equipment, papers, correspondence, records, and collected CW samples are inviolable. IIT members enjoy the immunities of diplomatic agents. Consult national escorts or a military judge advocate whenever immunity issues arise.

(5) IIT rights to inspect USEUCOM facilities are without prejudice to the U.S. right to protect sensitive information, equipment, and operations not related to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate. Local commanders and facility managers will work with national escorts and, if necessary, the host team, to manage the access of IIT members to sensitive facilities or areas IAW guidance from higher headquarters and provisions

of Confidentiality Annex of reference (a). Conflicts between IIT requested access and security of sensitive or classified programs and the U.S. host team will address facilities.

(6) The IIT and the national escort team will be provided a map or to scale sketch showing all significant site structures, requested/final perimeter, and geographic features of the challenged area within the jurisdiction of the USEUCOM facility. This map will orient the IIT and escorts to the major features of the installation, but should not provide such detail that sensitive or non-CW related information is inadvertently released. The entire installation need not be depicted on a single map.

(7) All inspectors, national escorts, and the observer, if present, will have distinctive badges identifying them and their status. No local badges will be issued to any members of the inspection party.

(8) Inspectors will not begin their inspection until they have been fully briefed on safety and security concerns. Component Command compliance plans should include a sample in-brief to ensure consistency and thoroughness of this brief, but may not exceed three hours in length. Briefs should never demonstrate an adversarial/confrontational relationship to the IIT.

k. Equipment.

(1) IIT will normally bring all the equipment needed for the inspection with them, but they may request to use U.S. equipment. All such requests will be referred through the national escorts to the host team and will be complied with to the maximum extent possible.

(2) If the use of U.S. equipment is authorized, U.S. personnel will accomplish operation of the equipment.

(3) The IIT is permitted to have and use two-way radios, other communication equipment, video cameras for exit monitoring, frame cameras (which produce instant development prints only), maps, charts, documents, other records, and approved equipment to collect, transport, and analyze material samples.

(a) OSIA is responsible for ensuring all IIT equipment used during an inspection has been examined and approved prior to use, normally accomplished at the POE in conjunction with the host state. OSIA is expected to provide a list of all equipment and supplies brought by the IIT and will be able to advise facility personnel on equipment capabilities and methods of use.

(b) Photographs requested by the IIT will be taken by national escorts or by facility representatives. If a photograph is acceptable to the inspector, the escort will take another identical photograph for U.S. records. Photographs will be retaken at the inspector's request. In this situation, escort personnel will retain rejected photographs.

(4) IIT equipment will be operated as agreed between the IIT and the host team.

Experience has shown that it is not possible to predict in advance all situations where inspectors may want to use equipment, or what questions are intended to be answered by collected data. Therefore, it is envisioned that use of the inspection equipment may in fact have to be agreed upon on a case-by-case basis. This requires extremely close coordination and immediate access to communications so that all involved personnel such as national escorts, facility technical specialists, and senior base personnel can consult on the best response to an inspector's request to employ equipment. In some cases, the OSIA may be able to offer guidance and the representative of the National Authority may need to be consulted, particularly if it appears that an inspector's request should be turned down.

(5) Facility personnel may be called upon to assist national escorts or inspectors by repositioning equipment or taking samples for analysis by the inspection team. Requested support activity should be coordinated with national escorts at all times.

1. Point of Entry guidance:

(1) The U.S. host team will constitute at the POE as soon as possible after challenge inspection notification. Those members of the host team unable to arrive at the POE will proceed to the challenged site.

(2) The number of people at the POE will be limited to the host team, no more than one assistant per member, and the OSIA equipment inspection personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

DAVID L. BENTON III  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chief of Staff

SUSAN M. MEYER  
LTC, USA  
Adjutant General

Distribution:

D+

COMUSAFE

Attn: XPXC

Unit 3050 Box 145

APO AE 09094-0145

Distribution:  
(continued)

CDRUSAREUR  
Attn: AEAGC-IO-TO  
Unit 29351  
APO AE 09014-5000

CINCUSNAVEUR  
Attn: N52  
PSC 802 Box 9  
APO AE 09499-0154

Appendices:  
Appendix A Abbreviations  
Appendix B Counterintelligence  
Appendix C Physical and Operations Security  
Appendix D Notification Checklists  
Appendix E OSIA CWC Notification Checklists  
Appendix F Specific Area Guidance

## Appendix A

## Abbreviations

---

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CRG	Compliance Review Group
CW	Chemical Weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DoD	Department of Defense
ECJ5-F	HQ USEUCOM Forces and Arms Control Division
ECPA	HQ USEUCOM Public Affairs
EIF	Entry-Into-Force
FIO	For Information Only
FSU	Former Soviet Union
HQ	Headquarters
IAW	In Accordance With
IIT	International Inspection Team
J5	Plans and Policy Directorate
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Meal, Ready-to-Eat
MTF	Medical Treatment Facility
NCB	Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons
OATSD	Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
ONA	Office of the National Authority
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
OSIA-EO	On-Site Inspection Agency Europe Operations
PA	Public Affairs
POC	Point of Contact
POE	Point of Entry
TDY	Temporary Duty
U.S.	United States of America
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USMARFOREUR	United States Marine Forces Europe
USNAVEUR	United States Navy Europe
USSOCEUR	United States Special Operations Command Europe

See Appendix GL of reference (c) for detailed glossary of CWC terms.

## Appendix B

Counterintelligence

---

---

1. Purpose. To provide planning guidance to USEUCOM Component Commands for counterintelligence and security support to challenge inspections conducted under provisions of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Counterintelligence activities should not interfere with legitimate CWC inspection activities. Questions concerning CI and the legitimate scope of inspections should be referred immediately to responsible component legal advisors for resolution with members of the national escort team.

## 2. References.

- a. Title 10, United States Code, "Armed Forces" (UNCLASSIFIED).
- b. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 Dec 81, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- c. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-24, "US Counterintelligence Effectiveness," 3 May 94, (SECRET).
- d. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense Regarding Counterintelligence Activities Abroad, 3 Feb 95, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- e. Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 4/1, "U.S. Government Defector Program," 1 Oct 86, (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION).
- f. DCID 5/1, "Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," 19 Dec 84, (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION).
- g. JCS Publication 2-01.2, "Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations," 4 Apr 94, (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION-WNINTEL).
- h. DoD Directive O-2000.12, "DoD Combating Terrorism Program," 15 Sep 96, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- i. DoD Directive 5100.81, "Department of Defense Support Activities," 5 Dec 91, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- j. DOD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," 19 May 77, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- k. DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I))," 12 Feb 92, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- l. DoD Directive 5148.11, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight," 1 Jul 92, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- m. DoD Directive 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," Jan 97, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- n. DoD Directive 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense," Jan 80, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- o. DoD Directive 5200.37, "Centralized Management of the Department of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations," 18 Dec 92, (UNCLASSIFIED).
- p. DoD Directive 5205.2, "DoD Operations Security Program," 7 Jul 83, (UNCLASSIFIED).

q. DoD Directive 5210.50, "Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to the Public," 27 Feb 92, (UNCLASSIFIED).

r. DoD Directive 5240.6, "Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program," 16 Jul 96, (UNCLASSIFIED).

s. DoD 5240.1-R, "Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons," Dec 82, (UNCLASSIFIED).

t. DoD Regulation 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 Apr 88, (UNCLASSIFIED).

u. DoD Directive 5240.2, "DoD Counterintelligence (CI)," 22 May 97, (UNCLASSIFIED).

v. DoD Instruction 5240.10, 18 May 90, "DoD Counterintelligence Support to the Unified and Specified Commands" (UNCLASSIFIED).

w. HQ USEUCOM Directive (ED) 40-1, "Intelligence - Mission and Responsibilities," 4 Jan 87, (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION).

x. HQ USEUCOM ED 40-11, "Intelligence - Counterintelligence Support," 23 Aug 95, (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION-WNINTEL).

### 3. General.

a. Concept of Counter-intelligence (CI) Support Operations. Using organic (assigned and attached) assets, Component Commands will collect, process, and report CI information to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters in support of USEUCOM's intelligence objectives in the case of a challenge inspection under the provisions of the CWC. CI support plans should include provisions:

(1) To counter intelligence collection efforts during CWC challenge inspections of U.S. facilities/systems.

(2) To provide CI support to USEUCOM personnel during CWC challenge inspections.

b. CI Activities. Component Commands will ensure adequate CI resources are appropriately trained and are available to protect against attempts of espionage, sabotage, surprise, subversion, unauthorized observation, other intelligence activities, or terrorism.

c. Responsibilities. CI activities will be conducted IAW references t-v, above, and respective Service Department regulations. General CI responsibilities are outlined in reference x.

### 4. Counterintelligence Organizations and Units.

#### a. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).

(1) CI elements will be responsible for providing CI support to any challenged USAREUR unit. The 66<sup>th</sup> MI Group, an Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) unit, provides echelons above corps CI support to USAREUR. Additionally, USAREUR has CI assets assigned to V Corps and at various installations throughout Europe.

(2) HQ USAREUR is responsible for providing CI support to the organization, planning and execution of U.S. Army sponsored challenge inspections in support of the CWC.

#### b. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE).

(1) U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) elements will be responsible for providing CI support to any challenged USAFE sites. 5<sup>th</sup> Region, Office of Special Investigations (OSI) provides CI support to USAFE.

(2) HQ USAFE is responsible for providing CI support to the organization, planning and execution of U.S. Air Force sponsored challenge inspections in support of the CWC.

c. U.S. Naval Forces in Europe (NAVEUR).

(1) NAVEUR elements will be responsible for providing CI support to any challenged naval NAVEUR site. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), European Field Office provides CI support to NAVEUR.

(2) HQ NAVEUR is responsible for providing CI support to the organization, planning and execution of designated challenge inspections in support of the CWC.

5. CI Related Information. CI-related information collected pursuant to CWC Treaty activity will be reported via DoD IIR to DIA as well as to normal service collection management channels.

6. Coordination.

a. Component Commands are authorized direct coordination/liaison with those U.S. commands and agencies necessary for plan implementation.

b. Direct liaison with Host Nation security, intelligence, or law enforcement organizations is authorized.

7. Proponent. The office of primary responsibility (OPR) for this document is ECJ2-CSD-CI. The STU III telephone number is DSN 430-7421/8154. Contact can be made by SIPRNET at the following address: **J2-CI@hq.eucom.smil.mil**.

## APPENDIX C

### PHYSICAL AND OPERATIONS SECURITY

---

1. All USEUCOM members, especially those individuals in contact with inspectors or an IIT, will be familiar with essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) OPSEC indicators, and OPSEC measures developed for their unit and location. Guidance on the control of critical information, OPSEC indicators, and OPSEC measures should be included in all component compliance plans.
2. Units will identify specific EEFI and develop procedures to control its inadvertent or inappropriate disclosure. As a minimum, the following examples of EEFI and critical information apply:
  - a. Details of unit mission, capability, and wartime role.
  - b. Weaknesses within a unit.
  - c. Future unit plans (such as operational, logistics, or training).
  - d. Information about the capabilities and limitations of weapon systems; command, control, communications, computer systems; and other critical defense systems.
  - e. Lessons learned or results from past operations or exercises.
  - f. Nuclear, intelligence, and security matters.
3. Personnel should not:
  - a. Exchange home addresses or enter into any "pen-pal" or other type of personal arrangements with inspection team members.
  - b. Give or receive presents or gifts unless part of an official function. Security personnel will inspect any present or gift officially received from an inspection team.
  - c. Discuss any military or official matters not related to the inspection or compliance with CWC agreements in the presence of inspectors, inspection assistants, or the observer.
4. Units will have a minimum of 12 hours following NRRC notification of intent to conduct a challenge inspection before the IIT arrives at the POE; a maximum of 36 hours following arrival of the IIT at the POE before the IIT arrives at the site perimeter; and a maximum of 72 hours at the site perimeter before the IIT is granted access inside the perimeter. During this time, units will execute OPSEC measures to protect sensitive material not related to compliance with the CWC. These measures may include, but are not limited to, shrouding, storing sensitive documents in safes, turning off sensitive computers and electronic displays, removing sensitive items from the challenged area, and limiting the inspectors to less than total access. OPSEC measures which could appear to provide less than full access should be coordinated with the national escort team.
5. The following guidelines apply to the IIT:
  - a. The IIT will have access within the final perimeter of the inspection site, to non-passenger vehicles (on a managed access basis) departing the inspection site, and mutually-agreed upon access to buildings, rooms, and equipment within the final perimeter. IIT access to personal property will be limited so as not to infringe on an individual's constitutionally-guaranteed freedom from unreasonable searches. Access to personal property in the workplace shall be restricted and will use the least intrusive means necessary to confirm that personal property does not relate to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate.

## C-1

b. National escorts working in close coordination with facility representatives will manage all IIT and observer access and activity inside the perimeter.

c. Inspectors may have access to documents and records relating to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate, as negotiated with the host team. Requests to examine records should be carefully considered, with facility representatives advising the host team on implications of any record release. All release of records will be coordinated with the host team.

d. Inspectors may have access to personnel assigned to the inspected site and may ask questions related to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate. A facility representative and OSIA escort will be present for all formal interviews. Facility personnel should be encouraged to respond in a straightforward, truthful manner to any questions posed by the inspectors. If questions do not seem relevant to non-compliance concern, personnel should consult accompanying national escorts before responding. Appendix F references interview guidelines.

e. Inspectors may request demonstrations of operation or processes, which may be relevant to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate. Such requests will be forwarded to the host team for decision.

f. Inspectors may take air, soil, and water samples during perimeter monitoring. National escorts and facility representatives should assist in this process whenever possible. National escorts should ensure that any samples collected by inspectors are analyzed properly on the spot or are properly secured and transported for subsequent analysis during the inspection period. Base personnel should examine sample material to determine any security implications.

g. Inspectors also have the right at any time to request that samples be taken for relating to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate. The national escorts to the host team for approval will forward such a request. The host team should comply with the request to the maximum extent possible and provide samples on a managed access basis. This is not intended to establish a policy of deliberate delay or obstruction of IIT activities but rather to ensure adequate time to protect sensitive information and assess any safety or operational impact of sample collection.

6. The host team may deny the IIT access to equipment, documentation, or areas that are sensitive and not related to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate. However, if the IIT is denied access, every reasonable effort will be made to demonstrate by alternate means that the area is not related to the non-compliance concern specified in the inspection mandate. Such alternate means could include exterior facility inspection, air or effluent sampling, or other managed access techniques. In any case, the national escort team should be informed of potential access denials and proposed alternative means to satisfy IIT concerns. If requested access cannot be managed to prevent putting sensitive or classified facilities and information at risk, the host team shall refer the issue to the CRG within the timelines specified in ref. (c).

7. Individual contact outside of the formal inspection process with IIT members, or the observer, or any unauthorized requests for defense information must be reported to the host team as possible.

## Appendix D

## HQ USEUCOM CWC Checklists

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has developed several dozen notification formats to use in the conduct of routine and challenge inspections. In the case of a challenge inspection against the U.S. within USEUCOM's AOR, these messages will be transmitted to the host country and to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) in Washington, D.C. The NRRC, in turn, will forward these messages to the On-Site-Inspection-Agency (OSIA), which will firebreak the message into one of ten voice formats, reproduced in Appendix E to this instruction. These OSIA messages will be processed at USEUCOM using the first three checklists in this appendix (see matrix below). Note that USEUCOM will only be included in the OSIA voice notification if the inspection will occur within the AOR, so OSIA Voice Formats 1 and 10 should, in theory, never be received by the USEUCOM command center, but are included for continuity.

OSIA Voice Format:	Description of Message	Use USEUCOM CWC Checklist number:
1	Notification of Intent To Conduct a Routine Inspection	1
1A	Notification of Intent to Conduct a CWC Challenge Inspection	1
2	Initial Arrival of the Inspection Team	2
3	Departure of Inspection Personnel from the POE for the Inspection Site	2
4	Arrival of Inspection Personnel at the Designated Site	2
4A	Notification of Challenge Inspection Team Crossing the Perimeter to Start Inspection	2
5	Completion of Inspection	2
6	Departure of Inspection Personnel from Site	3
7	Return of Inspection Personnel to POE from Site	3
8	Miscellaneous Report	2
9	Final Departure of Inspection Team	3
10	Intent to Rotate Inspectors at a Chemical Weapons Demil Facility	3

**HQ USEUCOM CWC Checklist # 4** contains actions for the USEUCOM command center if it is notified of a CWC challenge inspection by a foreign country.

**HQ USEUCOM CWC Checklist # 5** contains actions for ECJ5-F and should not be executed by the command center.

ECJ5-F is the proponent of these checklists and is authorized to make administrative changes to them.

D-1

HQ USEUCOM - CWC CHECKLIST #1  
for CWC - OSIA Voice:

<b>Format 1</b>	Notification of Intent to Conduct a Routine Inspection
<b>Format 1A</b>	Notification of Intent to Conduct A CWC Challenge Inspection
<b>N/A</b>	Host Government Notification on Intent to Conduct a CWC Inspection

Note: Handle notifications for actions contained in this checklist as IMMEDIATE precedence traffic. (Treat mock or exercise inspections in the same manner as real inspections).

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. Log Time of Receipt (TOR): \_\_\_\_\_ from whom: \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. If message is a **Format 1A**, Notification of Intent to Conduct a Chemical Weapons Convention **Challenge Inspection**, or a notification continued from USEUCOM CWC Checklist #4, then continue with the checklist.
- If message is a **Format 1**, Notification of Intent to Conduct a **Routine** Inspection, then complete step 7. No further action is required.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Notify component command operations centers or duty officers. Direct components to report their resources within the proposed perimeter within 2 hours. Record these resources at Step 8. Include unit POC and unit Public Affairs Officer at the inspected unit/location.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Command Center/Duty Officer</u>
USAFE	480-8200
USAREUR	370-8906/07/08
NAVEUR	235-4527/4080
MARFOREUR (Day)	4312-374, (Duty #) 0171-337-1007/08
SOCEUR	see SOCEUR recall roster in ETCC

- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Notify J5-F immediately at 430-5438. If notification is not possible at this number, or if it is after duty hours, then notify any one person from the following list:
- | <u>Name</u>   | <u>Home Phone</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|
| LCDR Malone   | 6877-402          |
| LCDR Churbuck | 6877-843          |
| MAJ Vogl      | 6877-425          |
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. Notify ECPA using the ECPA duty roster.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Start a new CWC folder. Post this checklist on the right side, voice format and hard-copy message to the left side.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. Photocopy the voice format, label it "J5-F", and deliver it to the J5 distribution box in ETCC.

- 8. Record component command resources reported in step 3 and pass to J5-F immediately.

Resource/ POC/ PAO

---

---

---

---

## HQ USEUCOM - CWC CHECKLIST #2

for CWC - OSIA Voice Format:

- Format 2** Initial Arrival of the Inspection Team  
**Format 3** Departure of Personnel from POE to the Inspection Site  
**Format 4** Arrival of the Inspection Personnel at the Designated Site  
**Format 4A** Challenge Inspection Team Crossing the Perimeter to Start Inspection  
**Format 5** Completion of Inspection  
**Format 8** Miscellaneous Report
- 

\_\_\_\_\_ 1. Log Time of Receipt (TOR): \_\_\_\_\_ from whom: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ 2. Notify component identified in step 8 of Checklist #1 in the current CWC challenge inspection folder.

\_\_\_\_\_ 3. \_\_\_\_\_ Notify J5-F immediately at 430-5438. If notification is not possible at this number, or if it is after duty hours, then notify any one person from the following list:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>
LCDR Malone	6877-402
LCDR Churbuck	6877-843
MAJ Vogl	6877-425

\_\_\_\_\_ 4. Photocopy the voice format, label it "J5-F", and deliver it to the J5 distribution box in the ETCC. Post this checklist on the right side of the CWC folder, voice format and hard-copy message to the left side.

HQ USEUCOM - CWC CHECKLIST #3  
for CWC - OSIA Voice Format:

<b>Format 6</b>	Departure of Inspection Personnel from Site
<b>Format 7</b>	Return of Inspection Personnel to POE from Site
<b>Format 9</b>	Final Departure of Inspection Team
<b>Format 10</b>	Rotation of Personnel

---

---

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. If message is an OSIA Voice Format #10, then no further action is required.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Log Time of Receipt (TOR): \_\_\_\_\_ from whom: \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Photocopy the voice format, label it "J5-F", and deliver it to the J5 distribution box in the ETCC. Post this checklist on the right side of the CWC folder, voice format and hard-copy message to the left side.

HQ USEUCOM - CWC CHECKLIST #4  
Notification of Challenge Inspection by Host Country

---

---

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. Log Time of Receipt (TOR): \_\_\_\_\_ from whom: \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Relay Notification to OSIA command center immediately, DSN 312-364-4480  
Comm: 001-703-810-4480
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Photocopy the Host Country Notification, label it "J5-F", and deliver it to the J5  
distribution box in the ETCC.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Complete HQ USEUCOM CWC Checklist #1.

HQ USEUCOM - CWC CHECKLIST #5  
ECJ5-F Challenge Inspection Internal Checklist

---

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. Verify NAVEUR, MARFOREUR, SOCEUR notification.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Notify Joint Staff. Determine who will be the host team leader.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Notify designated GO/FO, DCINC, COS.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Set up for GO/FO in-depth brief.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. Notify ECPA.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Notify USEUCOM Chemical Weapons Officer, LTC Blazek.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. Notify host country arms control implementation agency.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. Check for functional CINC assets (TRANSCOM).

## APPENDIX E

### OSIA CWC Notification Checklists

---

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has developed several dozen notification formats to use in the conduct of routine and challenge inspections. In the case of a challenge inspection against the U.S. within USEUCOM's AOR, these messages will be transmitted to the host country and to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) in Washington, D.C. The NRRC, in turn, will forward these messages to the On-Site-Inspection-Agency (OSIA), which will firebreak the message into one of ten voice formats, reproduced in this appendix. These OSIA messages will be processed at USEUCOM using the first three checklists in Appendix D. Note that USEUCOM will only be included in the OSIA voice notification if the inspection will occur within the AOR, so OSIA Voice Formats 1 and 10 should, in theory, never be received by the USEUCOM command center, but are included for continuity.

#### OSIA Voice Format: Description of Message

- 1 Notification of Intent To Conduct a Routine Inspection
- 1A Notification of Intent to Conduct a CWC Challenge Inspection
- 2 Initial Arrival of the Inspection Team
- 3 Departure of Inspection Personnel from the POE for the Inspection Site
- 4 Arrival of Inspection Personnel at the Designated Site
- 4A Notification of Challenge Inspection Team Crossing the Perimeter to Start Inspection
- 5 Completion of Inspection
- 6 Departure of Inspection Personnel from Site
- 7 Return of Inspection Personnel to POE from Site
- 8 Miscellaneous Report
- 9 Final Departure of Inspection Team
- 10 Intent to Rotate Inspectors at a Chemical Weapons Demil Facility

OSIA is the proponent of these checklists and may periodically update them. ECJ5-F will ensure that any changes made to these checklists by OSIA are reflected in the USEUCOM checklists in Appendix D.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

(CLASSIFICATION)

Date: 28 Aug 96

Page 1 of 1

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 1: Notification of Intent to Conduct a Routine Inspection**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #1 --- INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. TYPE OF INSPECTION: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 3. POINT OF ENTRY: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 4. ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL AT POE IS \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 5. MEANS OF ARRIVAL AT THE POE IS: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 6. SITE TO BE INSPECTED: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 7. AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE FOR SPECIAL FLIGHTS: (IF APPROPRIATE): \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 8. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 9. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

"OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT" (OR)

"\_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED".

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART II, C, D

**UNCLASSIFIED**

(CLASSIFICATION)

**UNCLASSIFIED**

(CLASSIFICATION)

Date: 28 Aug 96

Page 1 of 2

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 1A: Notification of Intent to Conduct a Chemical Weapons Convention Challenge Inspection**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #1A --- INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT CHALLENGE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION TREATY INSPECTION , STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. NAME OF STATE PARTY TO BE INSPECTED: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 3. NAME OF HOST STATE: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 4. REQUESTING STATE PARTY: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 5. BASIS FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 6. POINT OF ENTRY: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 7. ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL AT POE IS \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 8. SIZE OF INSPECTION TEAM: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 9. SIZE AND TYPE OF THE INSPECTION SITE: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 10. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES OF FACILITY OR LOCATION:  
\_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 11. GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE POINT OF SITE DIAGRAM:  
\_\_\_\_\_.

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART X, B

**UNCLASSIFIED**

(CLASSIFICATION)

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 1A: Notification of Intent to Conduct a Chemical Weapons Convention Challenge Inspection(cont)**

LINE 12. MAP INDICATING SITE LOCATION PROVIDED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
(CHECK ONE)

IF NO, DATE TIME WHEN SITE LOCATION WILL BE PROVIDED: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 13. AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE FOR SPECIAL FLIGHTS: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 14. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 15. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

“STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

“OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT” (OR)

“\_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED”.

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART X, B

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

Date: 28 Aug 96

Page 1 of 1

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 2: Initial Arrival of Inspection Team**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #2 --- INITIAL ARRIVAL OF INSPECTION TEAM AT POE, STANDBY"  
(REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z, INSPECTION PERSONNEL ARRIVED AT \_\_\_\_\_.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP) (POE)

LINE 3. ESTIMATED TIME OF DEPARTURE FOR INSPECTION SITE (IF KNOWN): \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 4. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 5. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

**IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:**

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

"OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT" (OR)

" \_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED".

References:

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 3: Departure of Inspection Personnel from the POE for the Inspection Site**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #3 --- DEPARTURE OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL FROM THE POE FOR THE INSPECTION SITE, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z, INSPECTION PERSONNEL DEPARTED FOR \_\_\_\_\_,  
(DATE/TIME GROUP) (SITE)

ETA AT SITE IS: \_\_\_\_\_.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 3. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 4. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

**IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:**

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

"OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT" (OR)

" \_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED".

References:

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION : Voice Format 4: Arrival of Inspection Personnel at the Designated Site**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #4 --- ARRIVAL OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL AT THE DESIGNATED SITE, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z, INSPECTION PERSONNEL HAVE ARRIVED AT \_\_\_\_\_,  
DATE/TIME GROUP (SITE)

LINE 3. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 4. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_.

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

**IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:**

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

"OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT" (OR)

"\_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED".

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART II, C, D

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION : Voice Format 4A: Notification of Challenge Inspection Team Crossing Perimeter to Start Inspection**

“THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #4A --- “CHALLENGE INSPECTION TEAM CROSSING PERIMETER TO START INSPECTION” STANDBY” (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) “MESSAGE FOLLOWS”

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z, INSPECTION PERSONNEL CROSSED PERIMETER AT  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

\_\_\_\_\_ TO BEGIN INSPECTION.  
(SITE)

LINE 3. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 4. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

“STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

“OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT” (OR)

“\_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED”.

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART II, C, D

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 5: Completion of Inspection**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #5 --- COMPLETION OF INSPECTION, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. INSPECTION COMPLETION TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 3. ESTIMATED TIME OF DEPARTURE FROM INSPECTION SITE: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 4. ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL AT POE: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 5. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 6. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART II, C, D

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

“OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT” (OR)

“ \_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED”.

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART II, C, D

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

Date: 28 Aug 96

Page 1 of 2

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 6: Departure of Inspection Personnel from Site**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #6 --- DEPARTURE OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL FROM SITE, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z, INSPECTION PERSONNEL AND ESCORTS HAVE DEPARTED  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

\_\_\_\_\_ FOR \_\_\_\_\_ ESTIMATED  
(SITE) (POE)

TIME OF ARRIVAL IS \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 3. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 4. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART II, C, D

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

Date: 28 Aug 96

Page 2 of 2

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 6: Departure of Inspection Personnel from Site (cont)**

IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

“OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT” (OR)

“ \_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED”.

References: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
VERIFICATION ANNEX, PART II, C, D

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

Form 1

1 Jan 96

Operations Center Checklist

**UNCLASSIFIED**

(CLASSIFICATION)

Date: 28 Aug 96

Page 1 of 1

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 7: Return of Inspection Personnel to POE from Site**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #7 --- RETURN OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL TO POE FROM SITE, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z, INSPECTION PERSONNEL HAVE ARRIVED AT \_\_\_\_\_, (DATE/TIME GROUP) (POE)

LINE 3. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 4. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z. (DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

**IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:**

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

"OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT" (OR)

"\_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED".

References:

**UNCLASSIFIED**

(CLASSIFICATION)

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION : Voice Format 8: Miscellaneous Report**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT #8 --- MISCELLANEOUS REPORT, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

LINE 3. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

ACC \_\_\_\_\_ NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

References:

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

Date: 28 Aug 96

Page 2 of 2

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION : Voice Format 8: Miscellaneous Report (cont)**

IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

“OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT” (OR)

“ \_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED”.

References:

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

**Form 1**

**1 Jan 96**

**Operations Center Checklist**

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 9: Final Departure of Inspection Team**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT # 9 --- FINAL DEPARTURE OF INSPECTION TEAM, STANDBY" (REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. INSPECTION TEAM DEPARTED \_\_\_\_\_ AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(POE) (DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 3. TIME OF REPORT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
(DATE/TIME GROUP)

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ AF \_\_\_\_\_ NAVY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

NMCC \_\_\_\_\_

**IF CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ALSO:**

EUCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USCENTCOM \_\_\_\_\_ USACOM \_\_\_\_\_ USPACOM \_\_\_\_\_

USSOUTHCOM \_\_\_\_\_

"OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT" (OR)

"\_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED".

References:

**Title: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: Voice Format 10: Intent to Rotate Inspectors at a Chemical Weapons Demil Facility**

"THIS IS THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VOICE FORMAT # 10 ---INTENT TO ROTATE INSPECTORS AT DEMIL FACILITY, STANDBY"  
(REPEAT ONCE)

(5 SECOND PAUSE) "MESSAGE FOLLOWS"

LINE 1. INSPECTION ID: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 2. POINT OF ENTRY: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 3. ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL AT POE: \_\_\_\_\_ Z.  
DATE/TIME GROUP)

LINE 4. SITE ROTATION WILL TAKE PLACE AT: \_\_\_\_\_.

LINE 5. NUMBER OF INBOUND MONITORS: \_\_\_\_\_.

"STANDBY FOR POLL, RESPOND WITH YOUR INITIALS, MY INITIALS ARE \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY \_\_\_\_\_ DSWA \_\_\_\_\_ USTRANSCOM \_\_\_\_\_

"OSIA HEARS ALL CONFEREES, OSIA OUT" (OR)

"\_\_\_\_\_ STANDBY FOR RETRANSMISSION, ALL OTHER CONFEREES ARE RELEASED".

References:

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(CLASSIFICATION)

Appendix F

Specific Area Guidance

This appendix contains a listing of approved specific area guidance issued by the Treaty Management Office and coordinated through OSD, Joint Staff, and USEUCOM. These specific documents are applicable to all USEUCOM components involved with a CWC challenge inspection. Current documents are maintained by ECJ5-F.

Subject

Date

1. Aerial Overflights	
2. Requesting State Party Observer	
3. Cameras and Photography	
4. Sampling	
5. Interviews	